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THE PRODUCTION OF BUILT FORM
Some notes on dialectical materialism, methodology and
an associative/projective architecture.
Brent T. Hinrichs
Submitted to the Department of Architecture on
January 18 1989, in partial fufillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Architecture.
This thesis is the begining of a parallel study of dialectical
materialism and built form, with the objective of
understanding how our observation of, association with, and
construction of the material world is conditioned by social
practice and production. I am convinced that we must produce
non-reductive and non-deterministic forms as part of the
continuing process of transforming existing social and
economic relations and structures. Therefore we need a
non-reductive and non-deterministic critical working
method, to understand the range of consequences of any
particular form[al] phenomena in order to make informed
selections in the production of new, transformed and
intensified physical definitions for our use now. Within the
condition of making an informed selection is the question of:
informed by what? This thesis will focus on the groundwork
for a continuing study of the dialectical exchanges between
built use-form/territorial definitions and the dynamic
social/economic relationships in a society.
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The work will consist of three topics:
- Dialectical Materialism
- Form
- Production
The first two topics will examine and make explicit a general
understanding of dialectical materialism and built form. The
relationships between them as both independent and
interdependent aspects of the material world, and of our
associative and social relationships to the material world will
be outlined. The explication of these two topics will rely on
the critical readings of, and assemblage of selections from,
the relevant works (written and built) both historic and
contemporary.
The third topic will focus on generative work. A
transformational design study of an existing early 20th
century housing project will be used to clarify a projective
methodology.
Thesis Supervisor
Maurice K. Smith
Professor of Architecture 0003
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The Production of Built Form
The definitions of production and built form as
used in this thesis need to be clear from the start.
Production refers to the range of "making" activities.
...production is at once both a general category and one with
definite social and historical characteristics... But it would be
a mistake to see Marx's or Marxism's understanding of
production as being exclusively preoccupied with material
production... Marx is clear that society produces its political,
ideological as well as its economic relations... The same is true
in the realm of ideas that are produced by the activities in
which we are involved as much as, if not more than, by the
act of thinking itself. ( Fine, 1983, p.396-397)
Built refers not only to a quantitative description of
the constructive processes of form making; as in actual
building, by man-made assemblage of material and/or
the geologicai and biological processes that transform
material through physical action, but also the
qualitative formal description of the results of such
processes.
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Form is material. It refers to the physical definitions
or organizational arrangements of matter. What we
use as form and can recognise as formal principles are
the general phenomena and organizations of matter.
Preface
We too have our own intellectual preconceptions. If we differ
from most scientists, it is in our deliberate attempt to make
these preconceptions explicit where we can... [ in] ... the
conflict between the materialist dialectics of our conscious
commitment and the mechanistic, reductionist, and positivist
ideology that dominated our academic education and that
pervades our intellectual environment.
Richard Levins, Richard Lewontin, 1985,
The Dialectical Biologist.
A thesis is not a debate but an emphatic, hopefully
lucid, exploration of a proposition advanced and
maintained by the presentation of factual references. I
am convinced that we must produce non-reductionist
and non-deterministic form/use definitions, as part of
the continuing process of our practical transformation
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of existing social and economic relations and
structures. Therefore we need a non-reductionist and
non-deterministic critical working method to
understand the range of consequences of any
particular form[al] phenomena in order to make
informed selections in the production of new,
transformed and intensified physical definitions for
our use now.
The focus of this thesis comes from working in,
reading about and observing material over several
disciplines and recognizing similar analytical methods
and critical understandings of the material world. This
dialectical materialist focus is to be found over a range
of disciplines including history, economics, the
physical sciences, the natural sciences, the social
sciences, the arts and urban studies; all fields of
enquiry in which the complex dialectical and material
relationships between individuals/populations and
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changing social, economic or physical environments
are the basis for critical analysis. However, these
studies, useful in indicating a methodological
approach, did not have a specifically
formal/architectural focus. What I have found lacking
in these disciplines, is a discussion of the material
world as an actual physical definition in terms of an
explanation of the qualitative and quantitative
form[al] phenomena.
Generally, in those disciplines where there was some
discussion, analysis or understanding of formal/spatial
organizations, the relationship of form to the dynamics
of social, economic and political structures remained
implicit or unexamined. What became evident was
that there was no direct understanding of the
interaction of formal/spatial organizations, of the built
material conditions, with social/economic structures. I
think that this is due, in general, to the fact that the
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dominant methods of description of the material and
social world, at this time, place and stage of social
development, are alienated and idealist: in a
capitalistic society the dominant methods of analysis,
of the physical and social world, are moulded by
capitalistic social and economic relationships.
It then seemed useful to make explicit a general
understanding of dialectical materialism, as part of an
analytical working method, in parrallel to an
explication of form as a physical definition of the
material world. As a first step we must understand
the general propositions and principles involved,
before we can make practical use of these theories in
relation to material reality.
...one of the most essential principles of Marxism [is] ... that
the purpose of theory is to guide the analysis of reality...
(Sweezey, 1981, p.31)
I think that in order to understand the historic social
relationships to built form, we must have an
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understanding of form as material phenomena. This
understanding can only come from the recognition
that the world is material, and that form is the
physiclal definition or arrangement of that material.
In order to understand and to make practical use of
our observations of material phenomena, we need a
descriptive taxonomy of form(s) and use. If we
understand that generic formal principles can be
abstracted from the observation of all material
phenomena, then we recognise that our observations
need not be limited to the present, or even to our use,
and that formal phenomena can be studied from over
a wide range of particular times and places, and sizes.
There is a choice to be made between the acceptance
of the current ideologically constructed alienation
from the material and social world, or the conscious
rejection of alienated production in the struggle to
construct collectively an active engagement with the
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world in all of its aspects. This thesis is not directly
about land ownership, the changing relations of capital
to labor or developments in production. Rather the
intent is to produce an outline for a continuing study
of theory and practice, in both form and politics. These
notes are an attempt to explicate form[al] theory, as a
practical tool; this is an attempt to understand what
exchange there is between a dialectical materialist
approach and an understanding of the material world
as form[al] phenomena in the context of our historical
and changing understanding of reality.
Men make their own history but they do not make it just as
they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen
by themselves, but under circumstances directly
encountered, given and transmitted by the past.
Karl Marx,
18th Brumaire.
The sub-title of this thesis should be understood
directly; these are 'some notes'. My working method
will rely on the presentation of references in each
main section with the addition of my working notes.
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1 The village of Balscott (Oxfordshire) in 1768, with the common
land farmed in small strips (from T. Sharp, English Panorama).
z The same village, after the enclosure of the common land (from
Sharp).
1.-0
The number of references to the extent of my notes is
varaible over each section. Therefore the result of this
ongoing process will be that some sections will,
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perhaps, be not yet fully developed, and, certainly,
contradictatory.
... whenever I consider the relations between country and
city, and between birth and learning, I find this history
active and continuous: the relations are not only of ideas and
experiences, but of rent and interest, of situation and power; a
wider system.
This is then where I am, and as I settle to work I find I have to
resolve, step by slow step, experiences and questions that
once moved like light. The life of country and city is moving
and present: moving in time, through the history of a family
and a people; moving in feeling and ideas, through a network
of relationships and decisions. (Williams, 1973, p.p.7-8)
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Dialectical:
Dialectique , oF [Old French] , dialectica , L [Latin] , dialektike,
Gk [Greek] , were all, in their primary senses, the art of
discussion and debate, and then, by derivation, the
investigation of truth by discussion...There was then a special
and influential use of dialectic in German idealist
philosophy. This extended the notion of contradiction in the
course of discussion or dispute to a notion of contradictions in
reality... It was then in Marxism that the sense of dialectic to
indicate a progressive unification through the contradiction
of opposites was given a specific reference in what Engels
called dialectical materialism.(Williams, 1976, p.92)
Materialism:
The central word, matter, has a suitably material primary
meaning. It came into English, in varying forms, from
matere, oF [Old French] , from materia , L [Latin] - a building
material, usually timber...; thence, by extension, any physical
substance considered generally, and, again by extension, the
substance of anything. (Williams, 1976, p.164)
Dialectical Materialism
Dialectical materialism as a methodology is explicit in
its recognition of change as a material condition which
results in an understanding of change as a process of
multiple contradictions that are variably resolved
over time. The world is not static and dialectical
materialism is not a static view of the world, but an
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active view, conscious of change as a fact, that seeks to
understand and guide our practical activities.
Dialectical materialism is not, and never has been, a
programatic method for solving particular physical
problems. Rather, dialectical analysis provides an overview
and a set of warning signs against particular forms of
dogmatism and narrowness of thought...
To attempt..to try to distinguish competing theories of
physical events or to discredit a physical theory by
contradiction is a hopeless task.
( Levins, Lewontin, 1985, p.191-192)
...one of the most essential principles of Marxism [is] ... that
the purpose of theory is to guide the analysis of reality...
( Sweezey, 1981, p.31)
The purpose of analyzing reality is to critically inform
our work in the practical transformation of reality. In
this sense Marxism is:
a philosophy of political praxis which enabled people to
work out not what would happen, but what needed to be done
in order to create the kind of future we wanted for
humanity... (Worsley,1984, p.23)
Dialectical materialism is actively projective (what
needs to be done), in trying to understand the
potential of our actions to direct change, it is not
passively contempletive or deterministic.
It should be borne in mind that historical materialism does
not pretend to explain every last detail of history. From its
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broad purview, many historical events, and certainly the
specific forms they take are accidental. Nor does the theory
seek to explain scientifically individual behaviour, though it
attempts to situate that behaviour within historical confines.
In so far as there are ineluctable tendencies in history, these
result from, not despite, the choices of individuals. The
explanitory ambitions of historical materialism as a
social-scientific theory do not commit it to philosophical
determinism. (Shaw, 1985, p.210)
Critical explanation is not determinism. Analysis of
material reality is not of necessity deterministic,
unless it is reductively alienated from the dynamics of
the reality we are trying to understand.
... the particular charcter of Marx's explanations is such that
they take the forn of an explanatory critique of an object of
inquiry which is revealed, on those explanations, to be
dialectically contradictatory. ( Bhaskar, 1983, p.255)
Materialism and Idealism
Materialism is certainly not a new understanding of
the world and its dynamics. But the recogniton of the
ontological (how things are in themselves) and
epistemic (how we come to know about how things
are in themselves) nature of the materialist position
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has developed and been transformed over time.
When we reflect on nature, or on the history of mankind, or
our own intellectual activity, the first picture presented to us
is of an endless maze of relations and interactions, in which
nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything
moves, changes, comes into being and passes out of existence.
This primitive, naive, yet intrinsically correct conception of
the world was that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first
clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is also
not, for everything is in flux, is constantly changing,
constantly coming into being and passing away. But this
conception, correctly as it covers the general character of
the picture of phenomena as a whole, is yet inadequate to
explain the details of which this total picture is composed; and
so long as we do not understand these, we also have no clear
idea of the picture as a whole. In order to understand these
details, we must detach them from their natural or historical
connections and examine each one separately as to its nature,
its special causes and effects, etc. (Engels,1878)
If we are trying to understand the world from our
observation of material reality, we need to abstract
some particular aspects of the phenomena that we are
seeking to understand. However if we do not realize
that these abstractions are singular facets of a
multi-dimensional world, we will understand them
only in isolated alienation. We need to understand
these abstractions, in themselves, as aspects of the full
0020
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range of the dynamic relations with other phenomena
of the material world. We also need to understand
these abstractions as being mental production (ideas)
taking place both within the material world and
within a particular social and economic formation.
To the metaphysician, things and their mental images, ideas,
are isolated, to be considered one after the other apart from
each other, rigid, fixed objects of investigation given once for
all. He thinks in absolutely discontinuous antithesis... For him
a thing either exists, or it does not exist; it is equally
impossible for a thing to be itself and at the same time
something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one
another, cause and effect stand in equally rigid antithesis one
to the other. At first sight this this mode of thought seems to
us extremely plausible because it is the mode of thought of
common sense. But sound common sense, respectable fellow as
he is within the homely precincts of his own four walls, has
the most wonderful adventures as soon as he ventures out into
the wide world of scientific research.Here the metaphysical
mode of outlookjustifiable and even necessary as it is in
domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the
object under investigation, nevertheless sooner or later
always reaches a limit beyond which it becomes one-sided,
limited, abstract, and loses its way in insoluble contradictions.
And this is so because in considering individual things it loses
sight of their connections; in contemplating their existence it
forgets their coming into being and passing away; in looking
at them at rest it leaves their motion out of account; because it
cannot see the woods for the trees. (Engels, 1878)
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Marx sets himself... in favour of the real world, conceived as
structured, differentiated and developing and, given that we
exist, a possible object of knowledge for us.
( Bhaskar, 1983, p.256)
The basic materialist understanding comes from the
recognition of the reality of our existence as part of
the material of the material world, and that the
material world (including ourselves) exists
independently of our recognition or comprehension of
it. However we can and do have knowledge of the
material world, and of ourselves, through mental
production. The idealist position would hold that our
thoughts and ideas transcend and are separate from
the material world and are only relative, because our
understanding of the world exists only in our
individual minds. The materialist recognition is that
the mind too is material, so that the mental production
of ideas is also material at its base, both in the sense
that thoughts and ideas are dependent on material
(chemical and electrical) processes in the brain that
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are common to all humans, and in that we think in
languages, which are both physiological and
historic/social in nature and production.
By materialism we understand above all acknowledgement of
the priority of nature over 'mind', or if you like, of the
physical level over the biological level; both in the sense of
chronological priority ( the very long time that supervened
before life appeared on earth, and between the origin of life
and the origin of man ), and in the sense of the conditioning
which nature still exercises on man and will continue to
exercise at least for the foreseeable future, Cognitively,
therefore, the materialist maintains that experience cannot
be reduced either to a production of reality by a subject
( however such production is concieved ) or to a recipricol
implication of subject and object. We cannot, in other words,
deny or evade the element of passivity in experience: the
external situation which we do not create but which imposes
itself on us.... This emphasis on the passive element in
experience certainly does not claim to be a theory of
knowledge - something which in any case can be constructed
only by experimental research on the physiology of the
brain and sense organs, and not by merely conceptual or
philosophical exercises. But it is the preliminary condition
for any theory of knowledge which is not content with
verbalistic and illusory solutions. (Timpanaro, 1980, p.34)
For Marx and Engels materialism... is simply the obverse and
alternative to idealism. It holds that ideas do not have an
independent or primary existence; that they emanate from
humanity and society; and that humanity and society are
integral parts of a nature that existed before there was
(terrestrial) life, including human life, and will continue to
exist after it has become extinct. Dualities such as matter vs.
spirit or mind vs. body are thus pseudo-problems; the infinite
For many years Ponge has
affirmed that the world, full of
natural autonomous objects, must
exist. Words, too, are objects that
impinge on the senses, demand
notice, provoke... His abiding
concern for language begins at its
source... in sound.The sense and
musical quality are percieved
together in an exploration of the
natural history or "gene-analogy"
of language. In practical terms, it
is a question of disrupting the
accustomed use of words, of
bringing back into the light older
meanings, with their sound values
emphasized. Successive meanings,
for Ponge, give words their
epaisseur, a physical density but
particularily a semantic depth.
This epaisseur constitutes a
materiality that makes words
directly exchangeable with things
as similars, and not as arbitary
signs that descendents of the
linguist Saussure would have
them. Once they are recogniized as
different from their names,
objects and words must be freshly
coupled.
( Fahnestock, 1979, p.10)
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variety of nature is a manifestation of different modes and
levels of organization of the ultimate building blocks of the
universe. ... There is thus no unbridgeable divide between
nature and society, nor, as a consequence, between natural
and social sciences. Every science has as its object to
understand/explain some aspect of reality; but since all
aspects of reality have special problems and characteristics, it
follows that each science has at least in some measure to
devise its own methods and procedures, and that the ease and
extent to which reliable knowledge can be attained vary
widely from one to the other.This, however, is no reason for
reserving the term "science" for the more successful ones
and denying it to those with less tractable subject matters.
( Sweezey, 1981, p.16)
Marx is never seriously disposed to doubt simple material
object realism, the idea that material objects exist
independently of their cognition; but his commitment to
scientific realism, the idea that the objects of scientific
thought are real structures, mechanisms or relations
ontologically irreducible to, normally out of phase with and
perhaps in opposition to the phenomenal forms, appearances
or events they generate, is arrived at only gradually,
unevenly and relatively late. ( Bhaskar, 1983, p.255)
The above is simply an extension of the recognition
that the material world exist independently of our
cognition, in that 'objects of scientific thought' exist
though they may not be directly visible or sensible to
us because of our physiological limitations. If we are
to understand these objects of scientific thought as the
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'different modes and levels of organization of the
ultimate building blocks of the universe', we need to
recognise that the results, of the relations of these
deep structure phenomena, will probably not be a
direct reflection of these phenomena.
When Marxists affirm the 'decisive primacy' of economic and
social structures, and therefore designate this level and not
the biological level underlying it as the 'base' of human
society and culture, they are right in the relation to the great
transformations and differentiations of society, which arise
fundamentally as consequences of changes in economic
structures and not of the geographical environment or
physical constitution of man. The division of humanity into
social classes explains history far better than its divisions
into races or peoples; and although, as a given fact, racial
hatereds and national conflicts have existed and continue to
exist, and although the ambiguous and composite concepts of
nation and of homeland always have a racist component,
there is nevertheless no doubt that these conflicts, at least
from the end of prehistory onwards, are fundamentally
disguised or diverted economic and social conflicts...
By comparison with the evolutionary pace of economic and
social structures ( and of the superstructures determined by
them ) nature, including man as a biological entity, also
changes, as evolutionism has taught us, but at an immensely
slower tempo... If therefore we are studying even a very long
period of human history to examine the transformations of
society, we may legitimately pass over the physical and
biological level, inasmuch as relative to that period it is a
constant... it would be naive to think that each single
superstructural fact was the repercussion of a change in the
infrastructure. ( Timpanaro, 1980, p.43 )
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Marx's and Engels's materialism is... not the denial of the
importance of ideas, concepts, and values for people, ... but an
assertion that ideas ultimately have a material origin in the
real conditions of existence, a history which consists in a
complicated interplay and conflict of different factors, some
directly material, some mental (though material in
origin).This interplay and this conflict are the driving forces
of history; they are the process which Marx referred to by
the word 'dialectic'... the term 'dialectic' means that the
process of movement which characterizes human history is
not a smooth development but a development caused by
conflicts and contradictions which lead to temporary
resolutions... It is by this process of conflict and
contradiction, caused by a multiplicity of factors all arising
from the natural conditions of existance, that history
proceeds to the human condition and human ideas current at
a particular moment. (Bloch, 1983, p.28-29)
Dialectics and Reductionism
The combination of materialism with dialectics transforms
both. Properly understood, the materialism of dialectical
materialism is not, like its traditional ancestor, reductive. It
does not reduce ideas to matter; asserting their ultimate
identity. It holds, dialectically, that the material and the ideal
are different, in fact opposites, but within a unity in which
the material is basic or primary. Matter can exist without
mind, but not vice versa, and mind was historically emergent
from matter and remains dependent on it.
( Edgley, 1983, p.120)
Dialectic refers to both the quantitative results of the
processes of change by which conflicting or divergent
forces are provisionally resolved in time, and the
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qualitative dynamics of the nature of such processes,
with the understanding that these are processes
occuring in time, and thus have a history.
Dialectical explanations attempt to provide a coherent,
unitary, but non-reductionist account of the material
universe. For dialectics the universe is unitary but always in
change; the phenomena we can see at any instance are parts
of processes, processes with histories and futures whose paths
are not uniquely determined by their constituent units.
Wholes are composed of units whose properties may be
described, but the interaction of these units in the
construction of the wholes generates complexities that result
in products qualitatively different from the component
parts... .In a world in which such complex developmental
interactions are always occuring, history becomes of
paramount importance. Where and how an organism is now is
not merely dependent upon its composition at this time but
upon a past that imposes contingincies on the present and
future interaction of its components.
(Lewontin, Rose, Kamin, 1984, p.11)
... in the dialectical world view, things are assumed from the
begining to be internally heterogeneous at every level. And
this heterogeneity does not mean that the object or system is
composed of fixed natural units. Rather the "correct" division
of the whole into parts varies, depending upon the particular
aspect of the whole that is in question... It is a matter of
simple logic that parts can be parts only when there is a
whole for them to be parts of. Part implies whole, and whole
implies part. Yet the reductionist practise ignores this
relationship, isolating parts as preexisting units of which
wholes are then composed. In the dialectical world the logical
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dialectical relation between part and whole is taken seriously.
Part makes whole, and whole makes part.
(Levins, Lewontin, 1985, p.272)
Reductionism as a methodology recognises the world
only in the isolation of specific phenomena from the
multiple phenomenal processes of which they are
parts and wholes. Thus complex processes are broken
down and analyzed in separation from their context,
reducing the multiple relationships to singular
'one-way' connections of cause and effect.
The dominant mode of analysis of the physical and biological
world and by extension the social world,... has been Cartesian
reductionism. This Cartesian mode is charcterized by four
ontological commitments, which then put their stamp on the
process of creating knowledge:
1. There is a natural set of units or parts of which any
whole system is made.
2. These units are homogenous within themselves, at
least insofar as they affect the whole of which they are
parts.
3. The parts are ontologically prior to the whole; that is,
the parts exist in isolation and come together to make
wholes. The parts have intrinsic properties, which they
possess in isolation and which they lend to the whole...
4. Causes are separate from effects, causes being the
properties of subjects, and effects being the properties
of objects. While causes may respond to information
0028
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coming from the effects ( so-called "feedback loops"),
there is no ambiguity about which is causing subject
and which is caused object...
We characterize the world described by these principles as
the alienated world, the world in which the parts are
separated from wholes and reified as things in themselves,
causes separated from effects, subjects separated from objects.
It is the physicai world that mirrors the structure of the
alienated social world in which it was concieved...
The alienated world is both ideological and real. Clearly, the
claim that the social order is the natural result of the
adjustments of demands and interests of competing groups is
an ideological formation meant to make the structure seem
inevitable, but it also reflects the reality that has been
constructed...
In a like manner, the alienated physical world is not only a
structure of knowledge, but a physical structure imposed on
the world. Which one of a chain of intersecting causes
becomes the cause of a given effect is determined in part by
social practise. ( Levins, Lewontin, 1985, p.269-270)
It is in this manner that reductionism can claim to be
the method of 'common sense' in that it is the result
of an alienated, inequitable and exploitative social and
economic system. Reductionism in social practise is an
ideology that limits the field of questions asked to
those where it is a self-evident methodology.
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No way of thinking about the world of phenomena can
provide a total description of the infinitely complex set of
interacting causes of all events. It is our contention that the
alienated world view captures a particularily improverished
shadow of the actual relations amoung phenomena of the
world, concerning itself only with the projections of
multidimensional objects on fixed planes of low
dimensionality. Indeed, it is an explicit objective of Cartesian
reductionism to find a very small set of independent causal
pathways or "factors" that can be used to reconstruct a large
domain of phenomena. An elementary exercise in design
courses is to make an object that is circular in one projection
square in a second projection and triangular in the third.
( We leave the solution as an exercise for the reader.)
Alienated science deals with the alienated world of these
projections, while a dialectical view attempts to understand
the object in its full dimensionality. Of course, some objects,
like spheres, are the same in all projections, so the
reductionist strategy succeeds.
The error of reductionism as a general point of view is that it
supposes the higher-dimensional object is somehow
"composed" of its lower-dimensional projections, which have
ontological primacy and which exist in isolation, the
"natural" parts of which the whole is composed. In the
alienated world things are at base homogeneous; indeed, the
object of reductionist science is to find those smallest units
that are internally homogeneous, the natural units of which
the world is made. (Levins, Lewontin, 1985, p.271)
What... dialectics asserts is that concrete reality is not a static
substance in undifferentiated unity but a unity that is
differentiated and specifically contradictatory...
( Edgley, 1983, p.120)
In other words dialectics maintains that material
After a lecture on the solar
system, philosopher Willaim James
was approached by a determined
elderly lady with a theory.
"We don't live on a ball rotating
around the sun," she said.
"We live on a crust of earth on the
back of a giant turtle."
James decided to be gentle. "If
your theory is correct, madam,
what does this turtle stand on?"
"The first turtle stands on the
back of a second, far larger, turtle,
of course."
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reality is not homogenous (undifferentiated) but "But what does this second turtle
stand on?"
heterogenous (differentiated), and not constant or
The old lady crowed triumphantly.
static but in the process of changing at variable rates "It's no use, Mr. James - it's turtles
all the way down!"
over time.
From an advertisment for
Natural History magazine
Dialectical Principles
Formalizations of the dialectic have a way of seeming rigid
and dogmatic in a way that contradicts the fluidity and
historicity of the Marxian world view... A dialectical view of
dialectics would emphasize that the principles and vocabulary
taken over from the philosophers have been transformed and
invoked polemically in opposition to, as a negation of, the
prevailing ideological framework of bourgeois science, the
Cartesian reductionist perspective. The value of the dialectic
is as a conscious challenge to the major sources of error of
the present, and our description of dialectical principles is
specifically designed to help solve the problems we work with
both in our scientifi.; and our political lives.
(Levins, Lewontin, 1985, p.268)
In contrast to the ontological commitments of the
Cartesian reductionst world view, there are dialectical
principles that are understood as a result of the
ontological nature of the material world.
In the dialectical world, since all elements (being both
subject and object) are changing, constants and variables are
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not distinct classes of values... The difference between the
reductionist and the dialectician is that the former regards
constancy as the normal condition, to be proven otherwise,
while the latter expects change but accepts apparent
constancy. ( Levins, Lewontin, 1985, p.276-278)
The first principle of the dialectical view, is that the whole is
a relation of heterogeneous parts that have no prior
independent existence as parts.
The second principle, is that, in general, the properties of
parts have no prior alienated existence but are acquired by
being parts of a particular whole... the parts have properties
that are characteristic of them only as they are parts of
wholes; the properties come into existence in the interaction
that makes the whole .... In the dialectical approach the
"wholes" are not inherently balanced or harmonious, their
identity is not fixed. They are the loci of internal opposing
processes, and the outcome of these oppositions is balanced
only temporariiy.
A third dialectical principle, ... is that the interpenetration of
parts and wholes is a consequence of the interchangibility of
the subject and object, of cause and effect. In the alienated
world objects are the passive, caused elements of other active,
causal subjects...
[The fourth dialectical principle is that] ...because elements
recreate each other by interacting and are recreated by the
wholes of which they are parts, change is a characteristic of
all systems and all aspects of all systems.
(Levins, Lewontin, 1985, p.273-275)
What characterizes the dialectical world, in all its aspects, as
we have described it is that it is constantly in motion.
Constants become variables, causes become effects, and
systems develop, destroying the conditions that gave rise to
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them... Yet the motion is not unconstrained and uniform...
The development of systems through time, then, seems to be
the consequence of opposing forces and opposing motions.
This appearence of opposing forces has given rise to the most
debated and difficult, yet most central, concept in dialectical
thought, the principle of contradiction. For some,
contradiction is an epistemic principle only. It describes how
we come to understand the world by a history of antithetical
theories that, in contradiction to each other and in
contradiction to observed phenomena, lead to a new view of
nature... For others, contradiction is not only epistemic but
political as well, the contradiction between classes being the
motive power of history. Thus contradiction becomes an
ontological property at least of human social existance. For us,
contradiction is not only epistemic and political, but
ontological in the broadest sense. Contradictions between
forces are everywhere in nature, not only in human social
institutions. ( Levins, Lewontin, 1985, p.279)
Contradictions, dialectically understood would, of
course, also be contradictory. Therefore, they are not
of any particular singular nature or kind. It would
follow then that the nature and kinds of oppositions
would also be variable, for example in the work of
Mao you will find discussion of:
a series of distinctions - between antagonistic and
non-antagonistic contradictions, principal and secondary
contradictions, the principle and secondary aspects of a
contradiction... ( Bhaskar, 1983, p.128)
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Production and Reproduction
Production and reproduction are fundamental to our
biological and mental existence, and are the basis of
our individual and social existence. As a species we
have developed the social organizations and means to
change our relationship to the resources of nature,
from one of mere sustenance to one of exploitation
and surplus.
...every society has to produce what it consumes, and it has to
consume in order to reproduce itself, to survive, and to carry
on the myriad activities that together define it as a
recognizable historical entity. Production is therefore
fundamental in an universal and unique sense, and a
scientific approach to the understanding of history has to
take this as its starting point. Furthermore, it is obvious that
the possibilities of production at any given time and place
establish narrow, though certainly not rigidly defined, limits
and constraints on what a particular society can actually
accomplish. ( Sweezey, 1981, p.23)
The label 'mode of production', though, is a misnomer, since
production never takes place except as part of a wider set of
extra-economic institutions and relationships. A mode of
production, that is, is never just a mode of production . It is
always a mode of production and appropriation . The economy
is always a political economy. More than that, it is always
contained within - and dependent on - a matrix of structured
social relations, of which the institutions governing property
are the most important for the economy, and from which the
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economy can only be abstracted by an analytical act. There is
no real-life economy-in-itself. (Worsley,1984, p.35)
Thus society can be understood in an analysis of the
relations of production, reproduction and
appropriation, and in analysis of which classes control
or own the means and methods of production and
appropriation.
Society viewed as a system for production and distribution,
conceived of independently of the actors representations or
justifications of the system, is what was later called the "social
formation". Only after the social formation had been
constructed could the evaluation of the role of institutions
and values be undertaken in terms of the place of these
consciously-realized phenomena in its working.
The significance of using this starting point, outside of the
actors' consciousness, cannot be exaggerated, because it set
Marx, Engels, and other Marxists on an analytical course
which was fundementally different from other social analysts
of their time, and which to a certain extent still distinguishes
Marxist analyses from many others. (Bloch, 1983, p.23)
Though the social development of production has had
a varied course and pace in different parts of the
world at different times, in general we can identify
patterns of production ranging from
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hunting-gathering to agricultural and industrial
production. Each of these categories is the result of
different relationships both between people and the
natural resources, and between people within the
society itself. These categories are of course not
mutually exclusive and aspects of each may be found
in most social formations.
What [ Marx] considered essential was the systematic
relationship between the organization of production, the
development of classes, and the type of property..., not any
particular version of human history. ( Bloch, 1983, p.37)
Marx concieves [of] fundamental structural contradictions as
themselves a historical legecy of the seperation of the
immediate producers from the means and materials of
production, each other, and hence the nexus of social
relations within which their action on (and reaction to)
nature takes place. ( Bhaskar, 1983, p.125-126)
The productive forces... include not just the means of
production ( tools , machines, factories and so on), but labour
power - the skills, knowledge, experience, and other human
faculties used in work. The productive forces represent the
powers society has at its command in material production.
(Shaw, 1985, p.207)
Therefore production includes not just the
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construction or assemblage of man-made or
manufactured form, or the physical transformations
and intensifications of man-made and natural
resources or material phenomena, but also the
knowledge and understanding of the man-made as
well as the naturally occuring physical phenomena.
Thus production, as an aspect of the practical
transformation of reality, requires both knowledge of
and action upon the material world.
... praxis is practice informed by theory and also, less
emphatically, theory informed by practice , as distinct both
from practice uninformed by or unconcerned with theory
and from theory which remains theory and is not put to the
test of practice... In effect it is a word intended to unite
theory with the strongest sense of practical (but not
conventional or customary) activity : practice as action.
(Williams, 1976, p.268)
...it is necessary first of all to show that a reference to praxis
can have quite different meanings, according to whether one
is declaring the inability of pure thought to make men happy
and free,... or declaring that knowledge itself is praxis tout
court. In the latter case, since to know reality is to already to
transform it , one retrogresses from Marxism to idealism - i.e.,
to a philosophy of thought as praxis, which makes action
seem superfluous. In the first case, however, although one
may not have abandoned the idea of enlarging the
dimensions of knowledge's 'active side', and although one 0 03 7
may not make any absolute distinction between knowing and
doing, it is acknowledged that knowledge by itself does not
provide a complete domination of reality. True liberation can
be attained only through the practical transformation of
reality.
( Timpanaro, 1980, p. 56-57)
Production of Ideas/Theory of Knowledge
The historical development of dialectical materialism
from Hegelian idealism directly transformed the
idealist understanding of the production of ideas.
A new theory will always set out to save most of the
phenomena successfully explained by theories it is seeking to
supersede. But in saving the phenomena theoritically Marx
radically transforms their descriptions, and in locating the
phenomena in a new critical-explanatory ambit, he
contributes to the process of their practical transformation.
( Bhaskar, 1983, p.126)
The dialectical materialist understanding lead to a
recognition of the production of ideas and knowledge
as occuring within the conditions of particular social
and economic relationships. This results in:
0038
[A] ... conception of knowledge in which the emphasis is on
the practice of the production of knowledge. This materialist
theory of knowledge rejects the empiricists' subject/object
split and its bias towards contemplation, which... removes
knowledge to a detached, passive and purely mental (idealist)
realm. Thus, in simple terms,...Marx asserts that knowledge is
not "found" by a thinking subjects contemplation of objects
but rather is produced in the practise of material interaction
between men, women, and things.( MacBean, 1975, p.5)
In this sense knowledge, and mental production, are a
part of the larger social relationships of production
and reproduction. The dialectical materialist
understanding is concerned with:
...how the beliefs and values which organise our society are
produced by the history of the social formation...
The starting point of this philosophical discussion (of the
production of ideas in history) is a rejection of the theories...
which saw ideas and institutions as the source of history, as
though these existed apart from the natural processes of
human production and reproduction. Marx and Engels argued
that we must understand ideas as products of people engaged
in this natural process and see the production of ideas as an
aspect of the general enterprise of making a living from
nature. This is the position known as materialism; it is
opposed to idealism which, in a broad sense, sees the basis of
human existence as abstract spiritual concepts whose origin
cannot be explained by natural circumstances...
Marx and Engels rejection of idealism, however, is qualified
in that they also reject the crude materialism which they saw
in the work of such writers as the German socialist
Feuerbach. If it is the natural conditions of existence which
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are the basis of human history, this does not mean that
human society and concepts are simply an automatic product
or reflection of physical existence...( Bloch,1983, p.27)
The reason that human society is not the direct
reflection of physical existence, is because human
society lives (produces and reproduces) in a dialectical
relationship to the material conditions of existence.
This dialectical relationship is conditioned historically,
to some extent, by the social production of ideas about
the material world.
...at any particular time people apprehend natural material
circumstances through their ideas, and they therefore act in
terms of those ideas, beliefs and values. Therefore, in history,
it is not nature and technology which makes human society
but man himself, who in terms of his already existing ideas
and values, makes his own history, as he encounters nature
and the problems it poses. These already existing ideas and
values are, however, themselves products of previous
encounters and answers to the challenge of nature. This
means that the relation of ideas and practical problems can
only be understood as part of the process of history. Ideas and
concepts held by people are not therefore simply a reflection
of how nature is at a particular time; they are the historical
product of the need to organise society so that human beings
in society can produce and reproduce. Ideas and concepts may
thus be in fact misleading as to the real condition of
existence; they are not the reflection of the economic system
but the product of a complex historical process of changing
adaptation. (Bloch, 1983, p.2 7 -2 8 .)
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In fact ideas are produced that reinforce the economic
and social systems and relationships that the ideas are
a historical product of.
Ideas of cause and effect , subject and object, part and whole
form an intellectual frame that delimits our construction of
reality, although we are barely aware of its existence or, if we
are, we affirm it as a self-evident reality which must
constrain all thought. We do not and cannot begin at square
one every time we think about the world. Knowledge is
socially constructed because our minds are socially
constructed and because individual thought only becomes
knowledge by a process of being accepted into social
currency. So dominat ideologies set the tone for theoritical
investigation of phenomena, which then becomes a
reinforcing practice for the ideology itself.
Inevitably some problems of understanding the world cannot
be solved in the commonly accepted ideological framework.
These are either considered "fundamentally" undecidable or
(are) discreetly ignored... ( Levins, Lewontin, 1985, p.268-269)
Consciousness... refers to the system of meaning through
which we apprehend the world, as well as the ideas, opinions,
and beliefs which we are aware of holding... we apprehend
the world through a system of meaning which we have
learned from others and of which language is an essential
part. This does not mean that ideas and language come
first."Life is not determined by consciousness but
consciousness by life"[ Marx, Engels,1846]. Consciousness,
which is indissolubly linked to language, is itself a social
product. It is moulded by the interaction of men together in
history and by their dealings with nature...
(Bloch, 1983, p.29)
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If we are trying to be explicitly conscious of theory as
a guide to the analysis of a reality that in itself
continues to develop and change, our production of
knowledge must also be a dynamic and developing
(and therefore contradictory) process.
Certainly Marxism has not solved all the theoritical problems
that are constantly being posed: it is not a schema, but a
perspective. This means that one is committed to developing it
unceasingly, proposing new concepts, rectifying laws that
prove to be incorrect, using it as a tool instead of repeating it
as a dogma . That is why the only justification of the
propositions advanced... is the fruitfullness of the empirical
research they give rise to... The main thing is not so much to
prove a point from the outset as to give rise to a dynamic that
gradually opens up a new field of research that responds to
the questions that are now being put to us by increasingly
explosive... contradictions. (Castells, 1977, p.ix)
It is also true that in this process of the production of
knowledge mistakes and misunderstandings will
occur, and these may not be self-evident. Thus
knowledge is provisional in the sense that change
continues, and in that our recognitions may be in error
or out of phase with the phenomenal events we are
seeking to understand.
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...an ideological misunderstanding/recognition can be
superseded, and therefore interpreted, only by a theoritical
analysis; this is the only way of avoiding the ... dangers
encountered by any theoritical practice.
...Such an undertaking requires the use of certain theoritical
tools in order to transform, through a process of labour, a raw
material, both theoritical and ideological, and to obtain a
product (which remains provisional), in which the
theoritico-ideological field is modified in the direction of a
development of its theoritical elements. The process becomes
more complicated in so far as, for us, there is a production of
knowledge, in the strict sense of the term, only in connection
with the analysis of a concrete situation. This means that the
product of research is, at least, twofold: there is the effect of
specific knowledge of the situation studied, and there is the
knowledge of this situation, obtained with the help of more
general theoritical tools, linked with the general context of
historical materialism. (Castells, 1977, p.2-3)
...The production of knowledge does not proceed from the
establishment of a system, but through the creation of a
series of theoritical tools that are never validated by their
coherence, but by their fruitfulness in the analysis of
concrete situations. (Castells, 1977, p.5)
A system of any kind involves relationships between
component elements such that change in one part
necesarrily leads to changes in the rest. Systems of ideas are
no different. But the degree to which all elements necessarily
change together and to the same degree varies considerably...
Marxism, then, like any other system of ideas, is not a thing.
It is constantly changing. Any system of ideas, too, deals in
general propositions that have to be glossed before they can
be applied to concrete situations...
The variety of Marxisms, however, derives from a further set
of social considerations; that like all theories, though they 0043
exist in peoples minds, they are intersubjective modes of
thought, shared by people who have common attributes and
purposes. To understand theories we have to locate them
socially: to understand the kinds of people, in different kinds
of society and cultural conditions who use them for distinct
purposes. (Worsley, 1984, p.p.26-27)
Ideology
Scientists, like other intellectuals, come to their work with a
world view, a set of preconceptions that provides a framework
for their analysis of the world. These preconceptions enter at
both an explicit and an implicit level, but even when invoked
explicitly, unexamined and unexpressed assumptions underlie
them.The attempt to analyze evolution as an interaction
between internal genetic causes and external environmental
causes makes the distinction between organism and
environment explicit. Yet underlying that distinction is the
unexamined and implicit principle that organism and
environment are indeed separate systems with their own
autonomous properties. ( Levins, Lewontin, 1985, p.267)
There are actual and real differences, oppositions and
contradictions between things within the natural
world and within the social world, just as there are
dynamic and dialectical relations between them.
It is... The polar antagonisms put forward as irreconcilable
and insoluble, the forcibly fixed lines of demarcation and
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distinctions between classes, which have given modem
theoretical natural science its restricted and metaphysical
charcter. The recognition that these antagonisms and
distinctions are in fact to be found in nature, but only with
relative validity, and that on the other hand their imagined
rigidity and absoluteness have been introduced into nature
only by our minds- this recognition is the kemal of the
dialectical conception of nature. ( Engels,1885)
The 'rigidity and absoluteness' stems from
contradictions within the social and economic relations
of the social formation, and within the relationship of
a society to the material world and the conditions of
its existence.
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling
ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of
society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The
class which has the means of material production at its
disposal has control at the same time over the means of
mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the
ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are
subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal
expression of the dominate material relationships...
(Marx, Engels, 1846 p.44)
Ideology, then, in class society is above all a weapon used by
the ruling class to inculcate in the masses the acceptance as a
given of the existing relations of production which privilege
one class at the expense of another. Ideology serves to
suppress the asking of fundamental questions about society / r A
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and its relations of production and to assure that what few
questions that do get asked are questions of how rather than
why, of reform rather than revolution, of how to
accommodate ourselves to "reality" rather than why a
particular system should exist at all, much less be elevated to
the status of reality and accepted as a given.
(MacBean,1975, p.321)
...people do not have to be conscious of the system of
production as such. They do have to make the system work, of
course, but in order to do this, they do not have to be
conscious of its nature. Indeed, Marx argued that in most
cases, because the social system is based on exploitation,
people have to be consciously unaware of the basis of society
if they are to continue working it. Because of this, a Marxist
theoretical constructuion of the social system implied that
one should start by ignoring people's beliefs and ideas and by
looking at who produces what and who gets what is produced.
This is completely different from what people might believe
are the contributions made to production by different groups
in society and what people might believe are the principles
of distribution. (Bloch, 1983, p.23)
...the ruling class's fundamental ideological task,...is to pass
off as reality - and thereby raise to the status of a
metaphysical essence - a system of social and economic
relations that is riot objective, as they would have us believe,
but partisan ( in their favor); not inevitable but arbitrary
(and arbitrarily imposed ); and, above all, not imutable, as
they would like to have us think, but capable of being
transformed in a revolutionary way. (MacBean, 1975, p.325)
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Marx sets himself... in favour of the real world, conceived as
structured, differentiated and developing and, given that we
exist, a possible object of knowledge for us.
( Bhaskar, 1983, p.256)
Now that, with the passage of years, I have stopped brooding
over the chain of infamy and ill-luck that had caused my
imprisonment, I have come to understand one thing: the only
way to escape the prisoner's state is to know how the prison is
built.
Italo Calvino, Marcovaldo
Form
Form is material, it is a physical reality. The
recognition that form is material and not a platonic
ideal, carries with it some consequences for areas of
production that work with form[al] phenomena. In the
historical development of literary criticism there is a
definition of form that I think is applicable to an
understanding of material conditions:
...[a] notion of form as a shaping principle, either in its
widest sense or in its most specific sense, where it was a
discoverable organizing principle within a work. With this
sense of form,... different questions could be asked about the
real formation of a work, which requires specific analysis
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of its elements in a particular organization.
(Williams, 1976, p.114-11 5 )
A materialist understanding of form comes from an
analysis of organizing principles to be identified from
our observations of the form phenomena; these
phenomena include all aspects of matter.
Everything that is everything in the world that has a form,
whatever it may be, is a product of some force, a vestige of
some energy and a symptom of some activity. In this sense,
everything has been made...
Ortega y Gasset
Everything in the material world has been made
either by natural forces or by man's transformational
productive processes, which range from 'stone age' to
'modern' tools or technologies.
Form and Matter
Matter is simply the name for what exists objectively, with
the one proviso that mind, thought, consciousness are its
products. All further questions as to the nature of matter, its
structure or composition, the relation of mass, energy, space,
time, etc., are not primarily philosophical, but are to be
resolved by the natural sciences themselves.
(Selsam, Martel, 1963, p.45)
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Every form of matter has a history or, rather, it is its history.
This proposition does not solve the problem of the knowledge
of a given reality; on the contrary, it poses that problem. For,
to read this history, to discover the laws of its structuring and
transformation, one must break down, by theoretical analysis,
what is given in a practical synthesis. (Castells, 1977, p.7)
It is a matter of aescribing 'a complex'. This 'complex' and its
parts... must be described and talked about as both objects and
subjects. What I r'ean is that I cannot avoid the fact that all
things exist both from the inside and the outside.
(Godard, 1986, p.239)
In any discussion of form I think it is reasonable to
say that we must start with the physical reality of the
world. Our understandings (conscious mental
production) of physical realities are conditioned by
the social/economic realities within which we live. Our
use of form is a social reality, interdependent with the
physical reality, which is constructed by a range of
material and social conditions. So any reasonable
understanding must deal with, congruently, both the
facts of form as a material condition and with the facts
of our physical and socially constructed association
with the formal phenomena.
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Form is material, specifically, what we recognise as
form(s) are the operational arrangements and/or
organizations of matter.
Let us take the term wedge. What shape is a wedge?...
Whatever else such terms refer to they do not refer to
individual shapes. They are in fact terms referring to a class
of arrangement of the matter within single things. A solid
single thing, after all, is merely a slice of space with a few
billion separate particles of this kind and that tottering about
inside it. When we say a wedge we are indicating something
about the way they are arranged...
The only way of closely defining the kind of arrangement of
matter which we call a wedge or a hook would be by refering
to the way it transmits forces. A hook will pull. A not-hook
won't pull. Shape, individuality, doesn't come into it...
The essential principle which [the designer] must embody in
the device he is designing sets limits merely to the extent that
if the principle requires 'a hook' then not-hooks are
excluded. But there is precisely an infinite range of possible
shapes for a hook. ( Pye, 1969, p.22-23)
When we understand that the material world is a
physical reality independent of us, our perception or
use, we can also understand that form is a
material/physical fact that is likewise independent. I
think it is reasonable to expect of any work to further
our direct understanding of the formal phenomena
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and the physical realities of construction, through the
assemblage of space/light and matter/dark, in the
generation of physical definitions for our daily life.
Since the end of the 19th century physics has
recognized that all that we know in our daily lives as
solid matter is, at a subatomic size, a 'fog' of electrical
charges (particles or waves). Thus, our basic
understanding of matter as an object of scientific
thought has changed. We can no longer understand
matter as the combinations and transformations of the
four elements of ancient physics: air, earth, fire and
water, once we recognize matter as the spatial
arrangements of electrical charges.
The difference between what we in our daily lives
recognise as a gas, liquid or solid is only a 'matter' of
density, arrangement and energy activity - with all
material states potentially transformable with
3 0 0
0051
temperature (energy level) changes. Gases become
liquid or solid, liquids become gases or solids, and
solids change to liquids and gases. What we can think
of as relatively stable arrangements of material are
actually just the arrangements of matter at a
particular situation or circumstance in a full range of
potential physical states "...all that is solid melts into
air..."
In our daily life things and materials are understood
to exist within the range of a normal state of things.
Water can vaporise or freeze solid, and can condense
or melt, within natural environmental temperature
ranges and we are not surprised. However, many
aspects of the various manufacturing and
industrialized production processes make use of
energy levels outside of the natural environmental
temperature ranges. This is of course, the only reason
these increased or decreased levels are of any
practical use: to make something that will be
0052
relatively stable outside of the energy level of its
making.
In the physical world there are changing states of
energy and therefore constant transformation. In
general, we can use an understanding of light and
dark to describe material (energy activity) that is
sensible/visible to us. Thus the useful everyday range
of matter is understood as being somewhere between
space (light) and mass (dark). So we can say that the
form of space is light, and that the form of mass is
dark. There are, of course, masses, such as crystaline
formations or glass, that are transluscent and thus can
have some of the formal qualities of light. Other mass
definitions are not translucent but are reflective, and
so can have some other form qualities of light. Our
observation of all material relies on the
electro-magnetically reflective and absorptive
qualities of the material, within the visual range of
our eyes.
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It is with the spatial assemblage of matter, some of
which we can optionally move through or use (light),
and some of which we cannot move through (mass),
that we physically build the formal definitions of use
and movement.
Form [allPhenomena and Form[all Principles
I maintain, in addition, that painting is an essentially
concrete art and can only consist of the representation of
real and existing things. It is a completely physical language,
the words of which consist of all visible objects; an object
which is abstrac& , not visible, non-existant, is not within the
realm of painting...
Gustave Courbet
All you can do in cinema is observe and try and put in order
that which one has seen if one has been able to see well.
(Godard, 1984, p.17)
Behavior: to act in a specific/particular way.
Phenomenon: is an observable actuality/fact, an
outward sign of work.
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Principle: generic facts of nature underlying the
observable workings.
It is the physical arrangements and organizations of
material that we recognise as form[al] phenomena. In
linguistics and anthropology there is the concept of
deep structure to describe underlying relations and
organizations:
Deep structures are not directly visible or observable realities
but levels of realty which exist beyond mans visible relations
and whose functioning constitutes the deeper logic of the
social system.
Maurice Godelier, 1977,
Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology
When dealing with material phenomena that are
directly observable in terms of our use and
association, we must be able to discern the differences
between the deep structure, operational and/or
organizational, aspects of the formal phenomena from
those that are specific or particular.
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Formal organizations are not a 'pattern language' of
specific determinative isolated factors, but rather the
deep structure understanding of the formal and
spatial phenomena of the material. The deep structure
can be understood from an analysis of the methods
and manners of functioning or action that underlie the
directly observable phenomena.
Although in many fields designers quite frequently make
inventions, designing and inventing are different in kind.
Invention is the process of discovering a principle. Design is
the process of applying that principle. The inventor
discovers a class of system - a generalization - and the
designer prescribes a particular embodiment of it to suit the
particular result, objects, and source of energy he is
concerned with.
The facts which inventors discover are facts about the nature
of the world just as much as the fact that gold amalgamates
with mercury. Every useful invention is a discovery about the
way things and energy can behave. The inventor does not
make them behave as they do. ( Pye, 1969, p.19)
Thus form principles are the recognition, through the
mental production that Pye calls 'invention', of
phenomena as behaviors of the material. This
materialist understanding of formal principles must
0 056
be made explicit in order for them to be shared and
applied as a reasonable method of analysis and
projection, and because if left implicit, these principles
could be considered personal or idiosyncratic. It is
important to remember that if there are actual
principles to be observed at work then"the inventor
does not make them behave as they do"
We need to understand what the deep structure of the
relationship[s] of the elements/aspects of form are.
The question of the relation of phenomena and
principles is not just a matter of understanding what
the formal structure/organization is, but also the 'why'
and 'how' of its development, and why or what to
continue or what to change, transform, or intensify
now.
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II: BEHAVIOUR / ORGANIZATION SYSTEN
1. Field Organization:
Three Variable Territorial "Packings" A:
B:
C:
2. Territorial Control:
Three References, A:
Intensifications B:
C:
3. Alternations / Self-Stability:
Five Methods: Three ACTIVE A:
Two PASSIVE
S
DIRECTIONAL
MULTIDIRECTIONAL
UNIFORM
CENTERS: Points + Lines
EDGES: 1. Registration
2. Mirroring
3. Lateral Displacement
OPEN FIELD: (Containments Deployment)
"Rocks-in-the-Sand"
DIMENSIONAL EQUALITY:
Directions "NORMAL
Form "in-COMPLETE"
RECIPROCITY: Directional EDGES Displaced
LIGHT-DARK REVERSALS
PROPORTION: Fractals, Golden Mean
BALANCE: "Composition," Resolved "Weight"
The most habitable / associative (built) environments in II:
BEHAVIOUR / ORGANIZATION include / exemplify 1A, 2B+2C, 3A,
3B, 3C.
(Smith, 1988)
There will be exchanges, continuities, partial
completions and collages of the above form[al]
relationships in any specific formation of a materially
0058
reasonable building or organizational system.
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Associative Built Use/Form
Association is the result of our cognitive relationship
to the material world, our association ( mental and
physical) with the actual landscape is the ground for
association with the intensified and transformed
landscapes.
I think that association is dialectical, in that we
associate some material phenomena through direct
abstraction to another material phenomena
(concrete--> abstract--> concrete), so association is by
nature specific, multiple and contradictatory.
The image that is evoked in us when we see form depends on
the associations which the form holds for us, and in this
process we are thrown back on our experience- ... of the
established patterns and systems of values of the world that
we know and that is familiar to us. ( Hertzberger, 1973)
Many people who have written about their
observations of form are anthropocentrically city
bound. This conditions an attitude towards a
I take SPACE to be the central fact
to man born in America, from
Folsom cave to now. I spell it large
because it comes large here,
Large, and without mercy.
It is geography at bottom, a hell of
a wide land from the beginning.
That made the first American
story (Parkman's): exploration.
Something else than a streach of
earth - seas on both sides, no
barriers to contain as restless a
thing as Western man was
becoming in Columbus' day. That
made Meville's story (part of it).
PLUS a harshness we still
perpetuate, a sun like a tomahawk,
small earthquakes but big
tornadoes and hurrikans, a river
north and south in the middle of
the land running out the blood.
The fulcrum of America is the
plains, half sea half land, a high
sun as metal and abdurate as the
iron horizon, and a man's job to
square the circle.
Some men ride on such space,
others have to fasten themselves
like a tent stake to survive. As I
see it Poe dug in and Melville
mounted. They are the
alternatives.
Charles Olson, Call Me Ishael.
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separation of social from natural systems that is the
continuation of the idealist dualistic split between
man and nature. I think it is reasonable to recognise
that the landscape existed prior to any human
inhabitation of the landscape. This is true today as
well. Any site exists and has physical definitions
before our next action takes place. This is as true
within an urban or rural environment, as it is in a
natural environment. This understanding that the
physical reality and formal definition of the landscape
existed, and continues to exist, before man inhabited
the physical world, seems a reasonable basis for form
observations being the understanding of changes to
the material world which had form qualities before
we constructed new definitions. We can still recognise
the actual landscape and understand human
inhabitation as some physical action on it. In the same
way we can recognise a transformed or itensified
landscape and understand any projected move as
. . . While the relationship between material
and built form is certainly generative, it is not
absolute. Materials have frequently reversed
their form-roles. A material that is a continu-
ous surface in one place and time might be a
framework in another. Form and material in
the natural landscape, however, except for
atypical "sights," maintain consistent relation-
ships: e.g., water flows in contours, trees grow
" out" from the ground. Families of multiple
use form, rather than those generated singu-
larly through engineered materials, are the
basis of physical associative use definition.
From them we can build up an inclusive,
deeply associative vocabulary evincing similar
ties and lateral developmental transforma-
tions in different geographies and cultures.
We can understand and relate to the form
families directly-history is always Now as well
as Then. We can find a series of assemblages
that together come close to a reasonable
method of formal projection for now.
(Smith, 1982)
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some action on it. These actions range over different
kinds of change from minimal intensification or
transformation, to complete obliteration of any
existing physical definitions.
We can generally understand man's inhabitation of
the existing landscape as being either long-term or
short-term in nature. This is both a temporal and
physical (formal) distinction. Historically the temporal
nature is a result of many factors relating to
fundamental differences in the productive relations
between the people in various populations to the
resources of different biological and geological
situations and conditions. Now we can also associate
particular formal phenomena and definitions with
these historically emergent relationships. It is
important to recognise that the constraining factors of
climate and of landscape are of different orders, and
that they are not completely determinative of social
relations: 0083
Geography provides conditions "without which"; it does not
offer a causal explanation of why.
Christopher Hill
Neither can climate, environment or material be a
complete and causal explanation of all building
activity or formal decisions. There is a limit to what
extent the material conditions of the physical
environment constrain our building of formal
definition. Neither climate, environment nor available
material is reductively causal, in the sense that what
is cannot be a completely deterministic explanation of
all building activity or physical definitions/decisions.
Climate is a part of the material conditions of physical
reality of any location, but in terms of human history
it has not been a singular causitive factor, because
humans live in a conscious transformative relationship
towards the range of environments. We have also
been able , as social/economic organizations, to
overcome some other physical/ biological constraints
on our physical activity - such as flight.
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Short-term inhabitations were, in general, of nomadic
origin; initially this was for reasons of scarce resources
for people and/or animal grazing. Now short term
inhabitations are for reasons of event duration, as in
camping, carnivals, festivals and theatrical
productions where the singular event is moved on to
another location for different social and economic
reasons.
Long-term inhabitations were generally the result of
either continued agricultural cultivation or the
repetitive serial or seasonal gathering of resources in
one location, such as coastal fishing. In landscapes
with some existing habitable physical definitions and
a moderate climate, this inhabitation generally was a
type of landscape intensification where habitable
formal aspects of the existing landscape were
extended or added to to increase the amount of
habitable territory available to the population. This
was necessary for reasons of population increase to
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protect the existing arable land, or to extend the
amount of habitable or arable land through terracing
in hilly terrains. In harsh (hot or cold) climates
landscape transformation was necessary to provide
the protection required for habitable territory.
Both long and short term inhabitations, in a variety of
environmental conditions, result in identifiable formal
definitions in relationship to the landscape.
0086
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Actual Landscape
The landscape has its formation and as after all a play has to have
formation and be in relation one thing-to the other thing and as the story is
not the thing as any one is always telling something then the landscape not
moving but being always in relation, the trees to the hills the hills to the
fields the trees to each other any piece of it to any sky and then any detail to
any other detail, the story is only of importance if you like to tell or like to
hear a story but the relation is there anyway....
Gertrude Stein: Lectures in America, "Plays" (Boston: Beacon Press,
1957, aftem Random House, 1935), p. 125 0087
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1. Habitable landscape
This continousThis <habitable landscape is a particular unframed collage-field ofThe ufae
formal definitions/materials/colours/lights... the presence of each <growth
form)) family... is optional, additive, and self-stable while (it) intensifies at
varying sizes the reciprocal form of the bay-water/land reciprocity - plan
low (<<shelter in outreach*) relief.
Perception of larger landscape includes the multi-meaninged <FORM) of
the reciprocally unbuilt...
(The general diagram would persist when specific built-form (e.g. ... to
harbour-town, etc.) reinforces/adds to/redefines parts of the already
usable assemblage. (Smith, 1982)
<liveable0
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The ground already has form. Why not begin to give at once
by accepting that?... In any and every case the character of
the site is the beginning of the building...
Frank Lloyd Wright
The Future of Architecture
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Landscape Intensification
Landscape intensification: This means that
we live with the friendly harboring landscape
and add to the characteristics of what is al-
ready there and almost habitable. A fishing
village follows the reciprocal form-zone of a
land-water bay. The "habitable" landscape is
much more extensive than the territories we
claim through building. Additive growth-
form is almost always directional with water/
use/access continuities.
(Smith, 1982)
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Landscape Transformation 3 6 0
Landscape transformation: By contrast, in
extremely hot, dry climates, we protect our-
selves from the environment. We usually
work egocentric form organization. Land-
scape transformation is polar from inten-
sification. Landscape characteristics are care-
fully controlled and transformed for survival
to alleviate unlivable conditions, (Smith, 1982) 0095
Camping
Camping: The next two families, compara-
tively recent in building history, omit the
"geo" from anthropogeomorphology and for
the most part are ecologically and formally
unsound. Camping is "visited" when both in-
tensification and transformation are ignored.
Buildings are composed, "solved," even built
independent from actual landscape facts/
attributes. Land provides merely subdivi-
sional sites for locating real estate; that is
0096
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unhappily the largest part of modern
building-modern nihilism. "Camping" in it-
self, where rampant, has destroyed the as-
sociative qualities of many world cities, and
we understand very well that nothing is being
intensified except the population density and
the access. "There is no there, there." (Smith, 1982) 0097
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Stage Sets
Short-term theater: In reaction to camping
has come short-term "fake" theater. Many
"designy" architects attempt to invent occa-
sions, usually through variously misguided
histrionics, light or heavy. They try to conjure
up events through set design instead of build-
ing additively in place, contributing to much
larger coherences. Both camping and short-
term theater have no real roots traceable to
landscape, and they are both therefore not
much good....
(Smith, 1982)
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Building Systems
Whatever our particular formal attitude to the
landscape is, when we build we build with something:
some materials, the organization of their formal
relationships, and the methods of their assemblage.
We are trying to build positive definitions for use,
with an understanding of what any building system
can contribute as and to a formal physical definition.
We cannot physically build with only mental
production about the material reality, we must build
directly with the actual material and space.
Form encourages or hinders rantcula uses/associations.
Understanding the associative 4behaviour# of form, then, permits the
selection, assemblage + deployment of built definitions to support use-
intentions.
The intrinsic ((Behaviour of particular definitions is (considered)
constant/predictable. Each participating (behaviour# family encompasses
polar opposites, for e.g.:
Continuity 2 Reciprocity Direction Completion
I Separation 2Adjacency ' Focus ' Partial definition
5 ontainment 6 ollageOpeness ' Subdivision
0099
identified through
Form families are used for
for e.g.:
their direct physical attributes,
Single-sided surface 2 Two-sides surface
Continuous 4Ground-Form * Inhabited *(Ground-Form>
Partial containments
Extrusions/Channels 4. Planes 5. Screens (-+ 3-D) 6. Lineal
frameworks...
Nos. 1 + 2 (Block> space directly; while, in Nos. 3 to 6 Light
Space
increases towards maximal eOpeness .
Each territorial self-stable form family IN TRANSFORMATION develops
the characteristics of another, while maintaining, recognisable, some of its
own properties.
Reversals Material
Substitutions Densities generate the (Place Range) for each Family,
e.g. for No. 2 4...Glazings displaced from masonry) walls...
(Smith, 1982)
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One and Two sided Continuous Surface...
0101
3-68
0102
3-70
..Partial Containments/Extrusions...
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...Planar Assemblages...
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...2D to 3D Screens...
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Screen definitions as a building system are made by
spatial assemblage rather than mass packing or
stacking. Screen definitions and are historically
* antecedent in tree inhabitation or 'virtual cave'
defensive brush building, both of which occured
before cave inhabitation.
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...Lineal Frameworks
0109
3-86
3-87
0110
3-89
3-88
0111
I
0
Y \IV)NrL-
The Finnish farmer built his farm himself, mainly during the
long, cold winters when farming was impossible but forestry
could be undertaken. It took him many years to complete; in
fact, a farmstead rarely reached a form that could be
considered as definitive. It could go on growing and adapting
over several generations, ... and many of the spatial and
organizational devices used were of a sort to permit and
encourage this. Amoungst these, the major ones are the use of
courtyards of all sorts, which have the peculiar property, that
once understood, they can be inferred from the sketchiest
information and are thus in a sense 'complete' at every stage
while still leaving room for growth; the transferable axis,
which together with the use of replicative plan rhythm
intends growth; the construction of joints ready for latter
marrying; and the concept of space like a 'box' and, more or
less physically defined, for each separate function, allowing
the addition of new boxes for new functions. By these means ,
growth and change are allowed for in a way that suggests an
appreciation of the transience of permanence and
encourages a continuing involvement by the farmer in the
creation of his milieu...
So the farmer was responsible for all parts of his farmstead,
from furniture to gatehouse, at all times. and this it seems to
me to be the key to understanding Finnish architecture,
which has had very few buildings that were intended to be
one-off, all-at-once, professionally produced buildings until
relatively recently. For, if a building is going to be assembled
over a long time, and by one man continuously working on it,
then this man needs the concept that in carrying out one
building operation at one time and on one level, he is not
restricting his potential to carry out other operations at other
times and on other levels. ( Glanville, 1978, p.20)
The same follows for any collective inhabitation over
time. The difficulty is in establishing a method of
building the potential for the continuation of other
0112
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building operations within the built organization of
the 'all-at-once' professional commercial production,
as well as transforming the economic relations of that
production.
The product is provisional yet something always
needs/is to be built and it needs, to some extent, to be
provisional in the sense of providing the formal
definition/situation for the ongoing process of additive
change and transformation- 'other building operations
at other times'. It is this continuous transformational
building method that seems a necessity for our
understanding of built form. If what is built is only
minimal ( reductive) and complete or finished it is
difficult for the next steps of inhabitation with the
range of building operations unless one of the
operations includes partial demolition-- otherwise you
are restricted to virtual two dimensional (decorating)
or three dimensional subdivisional defintions rather
than actual three dimensional spatial assemblage.
A flat surface will touch any other
flat surface at all points. No other
shape of surface will touch every
other of similar shape at all
points. A hemisphere, for
instance, will only touch a
hemispherical hollow at all points
if it has the same radius as the
hollow hemisphere; i.e. if the
surface is of the same size. The flat
surfaces need not be of the same
size. Thus a mason building a wall
need not fit each stone he lays to
the stone below it. Having cut all
his stones to flat surfaces first, he
knows that any stone will bed
steadily on any other without
having to be fitted individually...
An extension of the discovery was
that if the comonents of a
structure were 'squared', i.e. were
given two flat surfaces at right
angles, then they would not only
touch each other at all points of
the adjacent surfaces, but would
also both do the same to a third
component.
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At some reductive level structural facts are a
determinative limitation and constraint. My argument
is: why work at such a reductive and minimal level if
what we are trying to build are maximal physical
associations and defintions for our use and
inhabitation? In general the reason given is efficiency
- read profitability - of production. Therefore, in this
century engineering decisions are biased towards
minimal material and minimal singular definition,
often continuous surface monolithic concrete. In the
19th C. partially because of differing technical and
manufacturing constraints engineers built spatially
with the assemblage of multiple small pieces, as in the
work of Gustave Eiffel.
We take all of this very much for Q 90
granted...The extraordinary
rigmarole which I have had to use
in writing about it is perhaps
evidence that we take it as part of
the natural order of things,which
it is not.We have no colloquial
word specifically for'making a
surface fit another by touching it
at all points'. We very rarely need
such a word. If we want things to
fit in that particular way we give
them flat surfaces and they do it
automatically without our taking
any further trouble.
(Pye, 1969, p.49-50)
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Physical and Existential Phenomena
The formal/physical phenomenal aspects of both
natural forces and our actions are movement [actual
and virtual], as defined by direction(s)
[horizontal/lateral and vertical], within a field
organization [territory], through territorial
references.
Mobility is not something particular to us as a species,
it is one general characteristic of animal life, our
movement in the material world is a fact. It is also a
fact that we do not move at all times, we are either
moving or at rest. So there is the simple fact that we
move, or go, and we stop, for varying periods of time,
location, and intensities etc., in alternation. This is a
fundamental fact of our living in the material world.
Generally we move in a material world that is
understood as being horizontal in direction, with
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inclined or stepped actions being displaced horizontals
(lateral, vertical or angular displacements from
some territorial reference).
Moreover, we are not disembodied, we do not go and
stop in a vacuum but in the material circumstances of
physical definition as we come to them. We live in
form. Some of the physical definitions are easy for us
to move through, some are not. When we move though
a landscape one generally seeks the less arduous
definition present for one's movement. This is even
true of skill-testing activities, like mountain climbing,
when the challenge of even a difficult ascent is to find
the hardest possible route, but not the impossible or
impassable ones.
It is important to remember that any particular
definition exists whether we use it for access (or any
other use) at this time or not. The form is not
deterministically generated by our particular or
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singular use, it exists as a potential use-definition or
not whether you personally use it or not. A form may
be specifically useful and have phenomenal qualities
that we may understand or not, or that we may
choose to use or not. Our understanding and
recognition of these phenomenal qualities is part of
our association with form.
Perception and Preconception
Form exists outside of our association with it, and our
direct association with form is constrained by a range
of factors physiological as well as ideological in
character. However, our physiological apparatus for
perceiving the material world is fairly constant
historically across the human population, barring loss
or change through accident or sickness.
... there are human universals that are in no sense trivial:
humans are bipedal; they have hands that seem to be unique
amoung animals in their capacity for sensitive manipulation
and construction of objects; they are capable of speech. The
fact that human adults are almost all greater than one meter
and less than two meters in height has a profound effect on
how they percieve and interact with their environment. If
humans were the size of ants, we would have an entirely
different set of relations with objects that constitute our
world; similarly, if we had eyes that were sensitive, like those
of some insects, to ultraviolet wavelengths, or if, like some
fishes, we had organs sensitive to electrical fields, the range
of our interactions with each other and with other organisms
would doubtless be very different.
( Lewontin, Rose, Kamin, 1984, p.13)
Form language is the description of the the range of
the possible form phenomena, from which we make
editorial selections to itensify/extend our continued
use and associative understanding of the material
world. A reasonable form language is a (generative)
description of the material/physical facts. The
definition of form language as a descriptive system
has implicit within it the understanding that
description comes from observation and recognition,
both processes which are constrained by our
perception and preconceptions. In order to talk about
and work directly with form we need a reasonable
descriptive language of physical definition(s) that we
If we employ a sympathetic form lan-
guage, the desired use associations are made
more positive for the client and the user.
It's not a problem-solving thing; it has to
do with the nature of the form language
itself. The emphasis is on generating a lan-
guage that approximates social reality. We
have to be wary of intermediate languages
intelligible only to experts.
Architecture is a craft like cooking or
farming. You can learn to cook beans and
survive. In architecture schools, it is the
same way. Students very often learn to
operate in a particularly limited profes-
sional way. What we have is a language of
narrow professionalism. The form lan-
guage should not be confined to a partic-
ular local or regional style, or, worse still,
to an international style that obscures the
range of physical definition. The refer-
ences the language supplies determine what
the user gets. If the user knows everything
he wants, he may be shopping for a style.
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can share. Material facts can only be said to have
meaning by our associative use/understanding of
them, and the extra-physical aspects of this
relationship change (over time) through historical
transformations in the development of production
relationships in a society.
Our range of (pre)conception and association is limited
by our social/cultural situation. A reasonable system
of built use/form is not a perceptual or physiological
problem but a cognitive/productive ideological
problem.
0119
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We're trying to design for continuity, continuity of life and
optional continuity of experience...
but in general
we have to move about to see additively in order to build up
an associative completion. The 'whole' cannot be
experienced from any one position...
(Smith, 1982)
Organization and Formal Reductionism
Perspective as a Renaissance organizational system of
the visual, relied on the fixed position (time and
physical location) monocular viewpoint to which every
physical definition conformed, as a manisfestation of
the secular struggle for centralized power.
0120
In other painting traditions, perhaps most notably
chinese landscape scrolls, the viewpoints are multiple
and changing in terms of distance and orientation. We
know existentially that this only occurs through our
movement in space, so the implication of these
paintings is that of a journey through the landscape,
which takes place over time.
In 17th century Dutch painting there are specific
recognitions of the world seen outside of our actions:
The Dutch present their pictures as describing the world seen
rather than as imitations of significant human actions.
Already established pictorial and craft traditions, reinforced
by the new experimental science and technology, confirmed
pictures as the way to new and certain knowledge of the
world. A number of characteristics of the images seem to
depend on this: the frequent absence of a positioned viewer,
as if the world came first...; a play with great contrasts in
scale...; the absence of a prior frame...; a formidable sense of
the picture as a surface ( like a mirror or a map, but not a
window) on which words along with objects can be replicated
and inscribed; an insistance on the craft of representation...
(Alpers, 1983, p.xxv)
In the work of Cezzane there is also a recognition of
0121
3's92
the field that is visible to us , as a bi-ocular fact, in the
multiple planar image shifts in his paintings and
drawings.
012 2 Reductive organizations are based 
on a
mechanistic/thermodynamic model of every action
having an opposite and equal reaction, which results
in the the search for 'elegantly' reductive
self-referential singular biaxial symetries, which are
seen as a more 'basic' (i.e. hierarchial) order than
those more complex and less reductive orderings
which are often dismissed as chaotic or irregular,
because these ordering principles do not completely
determine or control what and where particular
form(s) are.
Reductive ordering systems must be recognised as
only a part of the range of organizational systems. We
need to understand the full range of form phenomena,
organizational systems and physical configurations,
and recognise that some are more reasonable/useful
than others, though all are factual.
The very sound of the word "disorder" generally provokes
uncontrollable nervousness. Therefore, it must be explained
that disorder does not mean accumulations of systematic
No way of thinking about the
world of phenomena can provide a
total description of the infinitely
complex set of interacting causes
of all events. It is our contention
that the alienated world view
captures a particularily
improverished shadow of the
actual relations amoung
phenomena of the world,
concerning itself only with the
projections of multidimensional
objects on fixed planes of low
dimensionality. Indeed, it is an
explicit objective of Cartesian
reductionism to find a very small
set of independent causal
pathways or "factors" that can be
used to reconstruct a large domain
of phenomena. An elementary
exercise in design courses is to
make an object that is circular in
one projection square in a second
projection and triangular in the
third, (We leave the solution as an
exercise for the reader.) Alienated
science deals with the alienated
world of these projections, while a
dialectical view attempts to
understand the object in its full
dimensionality. Of course, some
objects, like spheres, are the same
in all projections, so the
reductionist strategy succeeds.
The error of reductionism as a
general point of view is that it
supposes the higher-dimensional
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malfunctioning but, on the contrary, the expression of a
higher type of functionality, capable of taking in and
manifesting the complex interplay of all the variables
involved in a spatial event. Order comes from the selection
which isolates the variables being considered significant and
organizes them in a system which is as simple as possible, i.e.
so as to offer a stable solution. We know there is an increasing
tendency toward the organization of physical space according
to this reductive principle, and we know that it is the origin
of all the methods based on an addition which are universally
applied to the construction of the environment; for example,
the method based on the search for a typological order
according to which it is possible to separate and attribute
spatial prototypes- or a series of prototypes- to them. The
combination by addition of these gives rise to an
environmental whole: the street, the neighborhood, the city.
We also know that a city, a neighborhood, or a street, even a
building, is interesting to us for all that it manages to escape
from the control of these rules, for the expressions which are
"not permitted" but which insinuate themselves through the
cracks in the order and reveal themselves with all the wealth
of stimuli which is the property of contradictions.
The breakthrough of the unallowed expressions gives rise to
an imperfect configuration of disorder. The perfect
configuration would be achieved if these expressions were
included in a complex system organized from the begining to
include them. But that would imply a condition based on
collective participation- on the creative collaboration of the
entire collectivity- much different from the discriminatory
and segregational participation which we find in reality. In
that case, the organization of the physical environment
would come about by means of a process and not by means of
authoritative acts; the solutions would not be stable but in
continual formation.... (DeCarlo, 1969, p.21-22)
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object is somehow "composed" of
its lower-dimensional projections,
which have ontological primacy
and which exist in isolation, the
"natural" parts of which the
whole is composed. In the
alienated world things are at base
homogeneous; indeed, the object
of reductionist science is to find
those smallest units that are
internally homogeneous, the
natural units of which the world
is made.
(Levins, Lewontin, 1985, p.271)
In simple terms, you could say that
building order is the unity that
arises in a building when the
parts taken together determine
the whole and, conversely, when
the seperate parts derive from the
whole in an equally logical way.
The unity resulting from design
that consistantly employs this
reciprocity may in a sense be
regarded as a structure. The
material is chosen on purpose,
adapted to suit the requirements of
the task in question, and, in
principle, the solutions are
permutations of or at least directly
derived from one another.
(Hertzberger, 1984, p.39)
Territory and Geometry
Geometry... celebrates timeless immutable space. It rejects any
element of movement as contrary to the finite and absolute
which is its domain.
Hugo Haring, 1931,
The Problems of Art and Building.
I think that it is reasonable that if we are to
understand our use and inhabitation of form, that we
then must work with actual physical definitions
spatially and not with reductive geometrical
abstractions. Any theory that reduces actual spatial
complexities to only point and line coordinates, will be
in the position of medieval theologians arguing about
how many angels can dance on the head of a needle.
Territory refers to an actual physical definition, and
its dimensional qualities, both in itself and in relation
to other territories. Territory is both two and three
dimensional.
0125
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Collage and Subdivision
Collage is not an anecdotal approach to form, but a
process of physically building the dialectical exchange
between and with a range of different sizes and
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directions to build the field and continuity. One aspect
of this process is the dimensional building of the zone
of exchange between definitions and/or uses with the
assemblage of material(s) and space.
Subdivision as the word implies divides and separates.
In many subdivided site organizations the only way to
generate any exterior space is not to fill it in with
building, the only potential for a public zone is where
a territory at the size of a full building dimension is
left open. So the public zone is never something built
by and in the same range of dimensions as the private
territories but as a subtractive move from a packed
organizational system.
Internally the norm is for a reductionist
standardization to minimal dimension singular use
packed cells. In other times and places virtually all
buildings would have a reasonable range of
Collage: Not the insubstantial collage of
paper gluers or theatrical revivalists, but ad-
ditive collage in the sense that each different
family of form and each method of building
is sufficiently self-stable to exist in its own
right. The realization of the complex at any
given phase must still be coherent. The proc-
esses of; building can be intrinsically under-
standable, self-stable, but not complete. A
building foundation (ruin?) should be able to
survive as a landscape definition. As in any
democratic order, this means that each family
of buildings is as important as any other-not
necessarily as big or as strong, but as impor-
tant. Each process/action should contribute
something additional to the zone defined
without it-not totally controlled by it.
So we must observe the generative and be-
havioral and form families and make collages
of appropriateness. That is our job as de-
signers, to be on good terms with the "facts of
form." If we choose families of form inap-
propriate for a particular work-which we
are at liberty to do-we will be acting (design-
ing?) irresponsibly. If we choose and work
with an appropriate range of form, then we
will generate places parallel qualitatively to
our model-the habitable landscape and its
intensifica.tion-the only real challenge and
test....
(Smith, 1982)
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dimensions and numbers of use territories that would
not determine singular uses. The flexibility of
subdivisional building system lies in the possibilities
of different additive arrangements of the cells within
the subdividable box of the building, for control by
the management not the inhabitant. In general the
norm is a systemic attempt to restrict the focus on
problems of inhabitation to the personal and
individual rather than the collective and generic.
3 -95
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Dimensions or Useful Sizes
If we are trying to reach some understanding of
possible approaches to housing at a collective size, and
in particular the building of the public zone, then it
would seem that some reasonable examples available
for analysis are villages - or what has been called
"indigenous" as opposed to "high" architecture.
Villages have been either built or added on to by the
inhabitants over time, and particular buildings have
changed in use and individual inhabitants over the
years. This process of additive growth and change can
respond to local conditions of topography, material
and climate as well as social and economic changes. In
whatever way any particular village was generated
and continues to change, what we can observe now is
form and use.
We can only use these existing examples generatively
if we can understand them as a coherent system of
0129
building directly with form. This is the
result of the use of a set of dimensions, of recognizable
difference, generated by territorial use, not by
constantly variable dimensions or by a repeated
singular dimension.
Within each Iberian town studied the specific dimensions for each "tape"
are phenomenally consistent-while the entire family of dimensions differed
somewhat from town to town.
As expected, in easier / flatter terrain, building / collective dimensions were
greater than in difficult / sloping sites-transportation vehicle-aided versus
donkeys only, etc....
Each town's dimensional consistency, then, surely predicates a finely tuned /
agreed / enacted / asserted measuring system-"building inspector" with
official knotted rope? chain? marked sticks?-rather than the "intuitively"
shared understandings often attributed to under-documented indigenous
building / architectures.
There can be no doubt of similarly finite measurings / displacements in
urban plazas.
How ubiquitous / "mandatory" this particular behavioural / formal
attribute really is awaits further assimilation / assessment.
It is certainly observable as a convincing delineator of territoriality in
association with the other alternations (light-dark, Tr, reciprocity,
etc. .. .)-not only in building and design but also in a host of other
particular sizes / categories / media, etc. ...
The range includes ridge-roosting seagulls, the dark spots white aureoled on
foxglove petals, and, probably, Jacobs cattle beans.
Antienvironmental, disassociative, minimal modular repetitionisms
achieving variation / change only through removal / substitution receive no
further comment here.
(Smith, 1988)0130
Casares, Andalasia
Serpentine lines represent
"unfinished" rough rock-either =
full building height (at far right) or
at building wall to ground
exchange. This steeply ramped +
stepped street climbs 30 feet in 70,
generating, as it rounds the top-
right corner, an entire floor
height-donkey / manger below,
citizens / house up-stepped above.
In leveller terrain, people and
animal (erstwhile) doors alternate.
Still in landscape intensificational
development, this portion shows
the town's (yellow) basic building
dimension already securely in place.
Rough-formed (but red width)
street / public steps lead down / up
through a semiprivate outside
room / patio, once a stable
access / work area (furnished with
red-width slate wall-bench).
So public / private boundaries
vary / reverse through use /
occupation. There is no total /
permanent privacy "outside."
Similar use options pertain
throughout the town's exterior /
domestic porches / rooms.
3- 96
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What is important to note is that these ranges of
dimensions are not found in singular isolation, in
general you will find that dimensions are built in two
directions at any one location. Also you will find the
full range of dimensions within close proximity to
each other. This contrast and alternating deployment
of small and large dimensions is not alienating
because the public zone is built by dimensions that
are associated with access, small room and a range of
building sizes. This use of understandable dimensions
built from territorial use and systematically deployed
generates a coherent place that has options for growth
and change. The use of a range of territorial
dimensions sets the particular conditions for the next
range of choices but does not limit the particular
choices, you know that the dimensions will be used at
a particular territorial use but the dimensions
themselves do not determine the location or extent of
the next move(s) as would the hierarchies a
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proportinate or subdivisive dimensional ordering
system.
Why are indigenous inhabitations (villages, etc.) more
associative? I think it is that the organizational
systems used as well as the actual historic production
(and modes of production) were less alienated than at
present, see Braverman for alienation and degradation
of work in the 20th C.
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Review
Dialectical Materialism and Form
Matter is simply the name for what exists objectively, with
the one proviso that mind, thought, consciousness are its
products. All further questions as to the nature of matter, its
structure or composition, the relation of mass, energy, space,
time, etc., are not primarily philosophical, but are to be
resolved by the natural sciences themselves. (Selsam, Martel,
1963, p.45)
Therefore, matter and form are not primarily
philosophical in themselves but material, and the
material and formal phenomena need to be directly
understood as such. Form is both 'space' and 'matter';
form is the result of the spatial arrangements of
material at a range of sizes from the atomic to the
cosmic, and in this sense, it is universal.
Our association with form is conditioned by two facts.
Form as a material phenomena is a fact. That we are
observers, users and producers is also a fact. The
013 4 relationship between these two facts can 
only be
explained, I think, as being dialectically
contradictatory. This relationship is an aspect of the
ongoing dialectical contradiction between the
ontological and the epistemic; of how things are in
themselves and how we come to know how things are
in themselves. Moreover, by extension, not only the
'how' of how things are in themselves, but also the
'why' of the how things are in themselves and how we
come to know it.
... the particular charcter of Marx's explanations is such that
they take the form of an explanatory critique of an object of
inquiry which is revealed, on those explanations, to be
dialectically contradictatory. ( Bhaskar, 1983, p.255)
The most practical model to examine these material
phenomena and our associations with the phenomena,
I think, is not a structuralist or synchronic analysis,
but a diachrontic and dialectcally materialist analysis.
... structuralism makes the 'system' it studies into something
closed and intrisically coherent, and reveals no interest in its
genesis 'from below' , or in the relations between human
activities and their material determinations...
(Timpanaro, 1980, p.53 )
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With [a] sense of form [as a discoverable organizing
principle within a work] ,... different questions could be asked
about the real formation of a work, which requires specific
analysis of its elements in a particular organization. The
point was confused by distinctions between intersubjective
and social processes, and between synchronic and diachronic
analyses : terms derived from a tendency in linguistics, and
used either to express an absolute distinction between a
self-sufficient system in language and a system as a part of an
historical process, or to express an alternative emphases, now
on the system, now on the process of development of which it
is a moment, with real and dynamic relations between them.
(Williams, 1976, p.114-115) [Italics mine]
Thus we need to study both the historic development
of the social/economic relationships as well as the
form[al] phenomena of the material world, as
independent and interdependent subjects and objects
with 'real and dynamic relations between them'. Part
of this dynamic and dialectical relationship, is the
recognition of principles from the observation of
phenomena. When we understand the phenomena as
being ontological in nature, we then understand the
abstracted principles as being epistemic in origin.
Without any form[al] understanding or form
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principles, derived from the observation of material
phenomena, it would seem to be difficult to make any
consciously reasonable form decisions. However,
without any reasonable social principles or
understandings of political/economic phenomena, it
would also be difficult to recognise reasonable form
principles, let alone be able to apply form principles in
reasonable ways.
"What do you make of that?"- it is what we 'make' of
it in the realm of mental production which is a learned
or taught behavior, therefore, our range of
understanding and cognition is often conditioned and
constrained by the ruling ideologies. How we come to
know about things as they are in themselves is biased
and constrained ideologically, therefore, the range of
possible principles runs from those of active praxis to
principles of theory or practice which are partially to
completely alienated from each other.
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... praxis is practice informed by theory and also, less
emphatically, theory informed by practice , as distinct both
from practice uninformed by or unconcerned with theory
and from theory which remains theory and is not put to the
test of practice... In effect it is a word intended to unite
theory with the strongest sense of practical (but not
conventional or customary) activity : practice as action.
(Williams, 1976, p.268)
It is in this sense that active praxis is the practical
transformation of reality. To know in order to do: such has been my thought.
Gustave Courbet
...it is necessary first of all to show that a reference to praxis
can have quite different meanings,according to whether one
is declaring the inability of pure thought to make men happy
and free,... or declaring that knowledge itself is praxis tout
court. In the latter case, since to know reality is to already to
transform it , one retrogresses from Marxism to idealism - i.e.,
to a philosophy of thought as praxis, which makes action
seem superfluous. In the first case, however, although one
may not have abandoned the idea of enlarging the
dimensions of knowledge's 'active side' , and although one
may not make any absolute distinction between knowing and
doing, it is acknowledged that knowledge by itself does not
provide a complete domination of reality. True liberation can
be attained only through the practical transformation of
reality.
(Timpanaro, 1980, p. 56-57)
Moreover, I want to emphasize that by practical I do
not mean merely utilitarian activity, but that the
practical deals with the development of the full range
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of every persons human potential; a desire for
anything less is impractical and inhuman.
V: Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking , appeals to
sensuous contemplation ; but he does not conceive
sensousness as practical , human-sensuous activity.
(Marx, 1845, p.12)
VIII : Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which
mislead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in
human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.
(Marx, 1845, p.13)
Moreover, sensuous activity does not imply emotion at
the expense of lucid thought.
Godard deplores the way in which cinema ... has been
disfigured by a bourgeois capitalist ideology that permeates
its very theoretical foundations and has never been correctly
diagnosed, much less corrected...
Godard accuses bourgeois cinema of over-emphasising and
playing on the deep-seated emotional fears and desires of the
audience at the expense of their critical intelligence. He seeks
to combat this tyranny of the emotions, not because he is
'against' emotions and 'for' rationality... But he believes
strongly that the filmgoer should not be taken advantage of,
that he should not be manipulated emotionally but should
instead be addressed directly in a lucid dialogue which calls
forth all his human faculties.
The way things now stand, however, every element of a
bourgeois film is carefully calculated to invite the viewer to 0139
indulge in the 'lived' emotional experience of a so-called 'slice
of life' instead of assuming a critical, analytical and,
ultimately, political attitude towards what he sees and hears.
Why should one's attitude towards a film be political, one
might ask? The answer is, of course, that the invitation to
indulge in emotion at the expense of rational analysis already
constitutes a political act - and implies a political attitude on
the part of the viewer, without the viewer necessarily being
even aware of it. ( MacBean, 1971.)
Perhaps Lenin is most concise as to the ideological
nature of this opposition:
... any cult of spotaneity, any weakening of the 'element of
lucid awareness'... signifies in itself - and whether one wants
it this way or not is immaterial-a reinforcing of the influence
of bourgeois ideology. (Lenin, 1902)
In his memo on multiplicity Calvino quotes from
Raymond Queneau on the-surrealist movement:
'Another very wrong idea that is going the rounds at the
moment is the equivalence that has been established between
inspiration, exploration of the subconscious, and liberation,
between chance, automatism, and freedom. Now this sort of
inspiration, which consists of blindly obeying every impluse,
is in fact slavery. The classical author who wrote his tragedy
observing a certain number of known rules is freer than the
poet who writes down whatever comes into his head and is
slave to other rules of which he knows nothing.'
(Calvino, 1988, p.p.1 23 )
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Form and Knowlede
The problem, it must be admitted, is one of knowledge -
architectural knowledge. There is a substantial gap in our
knowledge of the social implications of strictly formal, hence
architectural, decisions. There is no adequate description and
explanation why certain types of spatial patterning seem
inevitably to lead to that curious feeling of disembodied
architecture, devoid of human contact and activity, any more
than there is an understanding of why common-or-garden
urban space of the past so easily provided a setting for the life
that nowadays seems so often to be missing.
...Designers do not have concepts and techniques that allow
them to describe and investigate the kinds of spatial order
that are to be found in highly complex physical objects like
towns and cities. It is because designers today do not properly
understand their spatial logic that they cannot develop a
proper understanding of their social consequences.
( Hillier, Hanson, Peponis, Hudson, Burdett, 1983, p.49)
The above aside, we need to recognise that a formal
description of a built spatial organization does not
purport to be the record of the actual historical
dynamics of production, but the description of what
exists (is built) at this time. If the formal organizations
we are trying to understand and describe are material
phenomena, then all material phenomena are the
'subject' of our investigations. This certainly means
not just the elite or 'high' architecture, but also the
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production of the populace: the popular or indigeneous
architectures, and all other human form-making
activities, as well as all natural formal material
phenomena. Everything. The universe.
For quite some time I have been concerned with the
man-made environment as a dynamic, everchanging
phenomenon. One can view the built environment as a
phenomenon composed of space volumes and material
volumes of every sort, form and dimension which presents
itself in an endless diversity of combinations. Through
observation we realize that this built environment is subject
to continuing change. These are changes which take place
gradually and, therefore, the casual observer would not
directly perceive the built environment as a dynamic
phenomenon... The built environment is in a continuing
condition of transformation. These transformations are the
result of human attitude. Man caused the built environment to
exist and he allows it to do so through continuing changes.
Thus we are talking about a process in which man
continually intervenes. By studying the transformations of
the built environment we can learn something about this
process. For the changes are naturally not arbitrary. Patterns
crop up; we can identify variations on particular themes. In
short, the transformations of the built environment betray
certain laws of the processes whereof this environment is the
tangible manifestation.
...Thus the relationship between human actions and their
outgrowth, the material phenomenon, can, in principle, be
formalized. ( Habraken, 1975, p.52)
I would again insist that the material phenomena of
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the environment are not limited to man-made
building actions, natural forces build too. The
relationships between natural forces, actions and
phenomena can also be formalized.
The design of complex, varied forms that are adaptable over
time and nontheless easy to control and to build demands new
methods and skills. In turn, such new methods and skills must
come from a good understanding of the structure of complex
artifacts. And much can be learned from the study of
enviroments wih a high degree of spatial complexity to find
out what their sructure is and what processes could make
them come about...An interest in these environments has
nothing to do with a romantic yearning for past conditions.
We are not looking at them to copy but to learn how today
structures of similar sophistication and resilience may come
about in accordance with the means we have today...What we
look for and what we are interested in here are systematic
properties from which complex environmental organizations
can be built. ( Habraken, 1987, p.3)
In the same way, observing the formal phenomena of
the landscape is not a nostalgia for some edenic
'golden age' in our relationship to nature, but simply a
recognition of what we can learn. When we recognize
form to be a material condition, and of being
phenomena with real structures, there should be a
human interest and simple desire to understand their
The client in architectural education is
the student. Everything we do must be
processed for the student, and not for
someone else. One must, presumably, de-
velop the student's capability, which means
that you must help them develop a lan-
guage and method of operation-a phys-
ical language of definition for people,
whether clients or users. That is, for all of
us. There is much fundamental back-
ground work to be done in order to de-
velop their competence to a stage where
they have the ability to do anything. What
we must provide is the general basis for
practice. We must teach them something
they can bring to bear on the needs of the
specific client.
Information we give students is based
on centuries of observation about place
and the use of places. It is not a matter of
abstract or geometric form or of profes-
sionalism designed to serve only the so-
called client, whoever that may be. What
they need is a sense of use-form.
MA URICE SMITH
1981
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actual nature and relations. What we understand and
what we do with form has to be for people, and for
animals, plants, water, air, rocks...etc., in short it has to
be for, not against, the material world. As a result we
must recognize that there will be contradictions and
oppositions between all of the above. Our work must
be towards a social and collective understanding of
the facts, not ego-centered individual opinion, because
agreements can only come from shared production
that is not limited to the personal or mystified in
basis ('there are personal opinions but no personal facts').
It also seems self-evident to me that in dealing with
environmental problems, and particularily with theoretical
aspects of the man-environment interaction, we cannot
ignore thousands of years of experience, insights derived
from the slow development of balanced interactions between
many generations of men and their settings. It seems difficult
to believe that all of our problems are so new that our sample
must be limited accordingly... Looking at.. archival material
extends the range of environments which we can study as
well as the range of people's reactions and interactions with
them. This broadens our view and shows us what has been
accomplished. If certain regularities and recurring patterns
can be discovered, this would seem to be primafacie evidence
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that there are some valid reasons for them, and it would seem
important to discover what those reasons might be.
(Rapoport, 1978, p.50)
Form phenomena are not by their nature derived
from human history, in that they are physical
phenomena, so by extension I would argue that the
reasons for particular formal phenomena are not
culturally relativistic. This is to say that form may be
culturally chosen, but it is not culturally determined.
Science, since people must do it, is a socially embedded
activity... Much of its change through time does not record a
closer approach to absolute truth, but the alteration of
cultural contexts that influence it so strongly. Facts are not
pure and unsullied bits of information; culture also
influences what we see and how we see it. Theories, moreover,
are not inexorable inductions from facts...
This argument, although anathema to many practicing
scientists, would, I think, be accepted by nearly every
historian of science. In advancing it, however, I do not ally
myself with an overextension now popular in some scientific
circles: the purely relativistic claim that scientific change
only reflects the modification of social contexts, that truth is a
meaningless notion outside cultural assumptions, and that
science can therefore provide no enduring answers. As a
practising scientist, I share the credo of my collegues: I
believe that a factual reality exists and that science, though
often in an obtuse and erratic manner, can learn about it.
Galileo was not shown the instruments of torture in an
abstract debate about lunar motion. He had threatened the
Church's conventional argument for social and doctrinal
The "facts" of physical form are partially
independent of the social conditions that nur-
tured them. If we feel sympathetic toward
foreign physical definitions, our relationship
with them may differ considerably from the
indigens. We can look at a painting or a
farmed landscape and feel friendly toward it
(associative) although we have contributed
.not at all to its generation. We don't have to
be farmers to enjoy walking in an orchard-
its space, screened light, or fruit. Nor need we
be Japanese to appreciate (in part) their tra-
ditional form-making.
If we believe that no associative choice need
be made about formal organization, then we
are likely to accept what we perceive to be the
current of the time. Because it is possible to
do this problem technically this way, we
should go with it and see where it takes us.
Whatever is current, however, be it isolation
and separation, whether it makes environ-
mental sense or not, is certainly going to af-
fect us.
(Smith, 1982)
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stability: the static world order with planets circling about a
central earth, priests subordinate to the Pope and serfs to
their lord. But the Church soon made its peace with Galileos
cosmology. They had no choice; the earth really does revolve
around the sun. (Gould, 1981, p.p.21-22)
What is important are the physical and social realities.
If a tree falls in the forest with no one to hear it, does
it make a sound? ... yes. Physical activities occur
whether we are there to perceive them or not, just as
territories for access exist whether anyone is using
that territory for movement at any particular time or
not. The qualities of any built definition do not depend
on constant use to maintain that definition. We should
be critical of the egocentric generation/understanding
of anything, in particular the idealist pretence that
nothing exists unless you personally have experienced
it. We know that singular personal use can't generate
the world itself for everyone because you do not
generate the world when you are born, or when you
get up every morning, but you may personally share
in what has been generated before, and contribute to
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new physical definitions.
Cultural and social realities are also real whether we
understand their roots or not. Moreover, the existance
of any particular cultural phenomena is not
'self-justified' because it is considered to be part of
the 'natural' development of the culture.
Cultural/social development is not justifiable as a
"natural" process, in the sense of 'natural' that means
inevitable and out of our conscious control because
rooted in "human nature". Our relationships to the
conditions of the material world are not passive but
active and dialectical, and culture does not develope
passively but by conflict and struggle between those
who benefit from a particular system of productive
relationships and its methods of exploitation [racism,
sexism, ..etc.] and those who are subject to it.
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Form and Political Ideolov
The tragedy of modem design, it seems to us, is that designers
never made a concerted effort to work out the form
implications of their social and political ideals. Indeed, the
very strength of their commitment to these ideals seems to
have led designers to feel that a concentration on form itself
was somehow superficial. Form, they felt, ought to be the
by-product of progressive social and political attitudes. But in
adopting this stance, paradoxically enougth, designers failed
to realize that the man-made environment is a political
system in its own right: try walking through a wall, and
you'll notice that it is the physical fabric, as well as the way it
is managed, that sets constraints on what you can and can't
do. Multiplied to the scale of a building or - crucially - a city,
this is indeed a political matter.
(Bentley, Alcock, Murrain, McGlynn, Smith, 1985, p.9)
There are theoretical tendencies within urban
planning that attempt to deal with some of the issues
that I have been examining, in an attempt to
understand the dynamics of the relationships between
form and society as taking place in an explicit context.
At the same time being urban in focus often seems to
preclude a more extended understanding of form as it
relates to all material conditions.
To consider the city as a projection of society on space is both
an indispensible starting point and too elementary an
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approach. For, although one must go beyond the empiricism
of geographical description, one runs the very great risk of
imagining space as a white page on which the actions of
groups and institutions are inscribed, without encountering
any other obstacle than the trace of past generations. This is
tantemount to conceiving of nature as entirely fashioned by
culture, whereas the whole social problematic is born in
indissoluble union of these two terms, through the dialectical
process by which a particular biological species ( particular
because divided into classes), 'man', transforms himself and
transforms his environment in his struggle for life and for
the differential appropriation of the product of his labour.
Space is a material product, in relation with other material
elements - amoung others, men, who themselves enter into
particular social relations, which give to space ( and to the
other elements of the combination) a form, a function, a
social signification. It is not, therefore, a mere occasion for
the deployment of social structure, but a concrete expression
of each historical ensemble in which a society is specified. It
is a question, then, of establishing, in the same way as for any
other real object, the structural and conjunctural laws that
govern its existence and transformation, and the specificity
of its articulation with the other elements of a historical
reality. (Castells, 1977, p. 115)
I would argue that space and form already exist, and
that we come to it and transform it or not, whether it
is natural or of social production. Therefore, we then
do need to establish 'the structural and conjunctural
laws that govern its existence and transformation' for
form in itself, and for form in dialectical relation to
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social and economic structures.
...one must go further than the ideological opposition between
the the determination of space by nature and its shaping by
culture, to unite these two terms in a problematic that
recognizes the specificity of the humanly social, without
seeing it as a deliberate creation which cannot be explained
by laws. To the common ideological front of culturalism and
historicism, we must oppose a theoretical front that integrates
the ecological, materialist-based problematic in a sociological
analysis whose central theme is the contradictory action of
social agents (social classes), but whose foundation is the
structural web that creates the problematic of any society -
that is to say, the way in which a social formation fashions
nature, and the mode of distribution and administration, and
therefore of contradiction, that stems from it.
(Castells, 1977, p.122)
In other urban planning views, however, all form is
reduced to being the determined factor and/or effect
of social relations.
By giving shape and form to our material world, architecture
structures the system of space in which we live and move. In
that it does so, it has a direct relation - rather than a merely
symbolic one - to social life, since it provides the material
preconditions for the patterns of movement, encounter and
avoidance which are the material realization - as well as
sometimes the generator - of social relations.
(Hillier, Hanson, 1984, preface)
Hillier and Hanson procede on a completely reductive
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and abstracted analysis, that on one hand is
completely aformal, and on the other completely
anthropocentric in their consideration of form as being
only man-made. This argument is biased towards only
man-made physical definitions, as if naturally
occuring definitions were not as 'formed', or as if a
physical definition only exists if it has been the
subject of an idea before it is a material reality. It is
here that their idealist bias is revealed. Instead of
examining our material association with form they
couch the terms of their methodology in the 'objective'
examination of the adjacencies of minimal cellular
organization. This is perhaps useful for prison
planning but not for the examination of openly
complex physical definitions ( like landscapes).
... syntatic generators are right for the job they are intended
to do : capturing the formal dimensions of real-world spatial
systems in terms of the social logic behind them...We are
convinced that it is unnecessary to specify shape in order to
model real-world generative processes; indeed, that the
concept of shape obscures the fundamental relational notions
that underpin human spatial order...
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To our way of thinking, two concepts underpin the
geographic approach to formal spatial analysis...: these are
the notion of distance; and the notion of location. It is crucial
to our approach that neither of these concepts... appears in
the foundations of 'space syntax'.
(Hillier, Hanson, 1984, preface)
In this argument 'formal dimensions' are neither
formal or dimensional, and hence not spatial.
Therefore, I think it is reasonable to argue that this
'space syntax' cannot possibly describe spatial
organizations and relationships. In fact Hillier and
Hanson are reduced to 'connect the dot' wiring
diagrams of path and point adjacencies or replicating
packed minimal cellular organizations.
The ordering of space in buildings is really about the
ordering of relations between people. Because this is so,
society enters into the very nature and form of buildings.
They are social objects through their very form as objects.
Architecture is not a 'social art' simply because buildings are
important visual symbols of society, but also, through the
ways in which buildings, individually and collectively, create
and order space, we are able to recognise society : that it
exists and has a certain form.
... in talking about buidings, we need not only talk about
objects, but also about systems of spatial relations.
...In these circumstances an explicit discourse of
architectural space and its social logic is an absolute
requirement.
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But in spite of its centrality in the act of creating
architecture,... the question of space has failed to become
central in the academic and critical discourses that surround
architecture. When space does feature in architectural
criticism, it is usually at the level of the surfaces that define
the space, rather than in terms of the space itself; when it is
about space , it is usually at the level of the individual space
rather than at the level of the system of spatial relations that
constitute the building or settlement.
(Hillier, Hanson, 1984, p. 2-3)
... Our intial aim has been to show how order in space
originates in social life, and therefore to pinpoint the ways in
which society already pervades those patterns of space that
need to be described and analysed. Only when this is
understood is it possible to make a theoretical link to patterns
of use.
... by the assumption that what is to be sought is a relation
between the [abstract immaterial] 'social' subject ( whether
individual or group) and the [ material] 'spatial' object acting
as distinct entities, space is desocialised at the same time as
society is despaLialised. This misrepresents the problem at a
very deep level, since it makes unavailable the most
fundemental fact of space: that through its ordering of space
the man-made physical world is already a social behaviour. It
constitutes a form of order in itself: one which is created for
social purposes, whether by design or accumulatively, and
through which society is both constrained and recognisable.
It must be the first task of theory to describe space as such a
system. (Hillier, Hanson, 1984, p. 8-9)
On the contrary, it is the statement of the 'problem' as
one of the distinction between object and subject (or
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form and content), whatever other qualities are
ascribed to them, that is the deep, and ideological,
misrepresentation. Social formations build on existin
spatial and formal 'patterns' whether they are natural
or man-made in origin, within the constraints of all
material phenomena.
..Marxist film criticism ... refuses to make an artificial
distinction between form and content...Instead, with detailed
analysis of the specifically cinematic relations between
images and sounds, contemporary Marxist film criticism
focuses precisely on the way the world's... contradictions - are
manifested in images and sounds on celluloid.
( MacBean, 1975, p.17 )
By extension we need to to focus on a detailed
analysis of the specifically formal relations as a
product of the contradictions of the material world.
Form and the Practice of Architecture
The architect, as we know, has never been very human:
throughout history he has always served the happy few and
never the great number. Since building costs money, he was
always on the side of money...
... that the aim of architecture is
not to produce 'objects' but to give
organization and form to the space
in which human events occur; to
develop 'processes', which
eventually give rise to physical
configurations, but in fact begin
before these configurations
materialise and continue after
their dissolution, living on in
memory and projecting
themselves on other processes.
...that architecture consists
essentially in the relationships
between its configuration, the
surrounding physical world, and
whoever experiences it through
use,contemplation or even casual
encounter. ( DeCarlo,1978, p.35)
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He has occupied himself with pyramids, temples, cathedrals,
palaces, and office buildings, and more often allowed himself
to be exploited as a tool for repressing people, than helping
them to liberate themselves.
Partly as a result of his forced marraige with aesthetics, he
has existed more to honour and celebrate the established
order of the few, than to stimulate better conditions for the
many, more servant of the repressors than of the repressed.
( Hertzberger, 1973)
The integration of ... the functional structure and of the
formal and organizational quality of the environment brings
back the question into the real field of architecture, because
it restores the circuit of relationships between physical
configurations, their real motivations and their concrete
consequences. ( DeCarlo,1978, p.36)
Centuries of being left out of the process of transformation in
the physical environment have firmly convinced people that
there is no possibility for collective expression to intervene
in this process. By now there seem to be no alternatives to the
models elaborated by the ruling class and the functional,
organizational, and aesthetic principles on which they are
based seem to be the only possible ones. This numbness of the
consciousness and the senses gives rise to alienation; and for
this reason, even the rare cases in which direct action is
possible, people go on choosing expressive typologies and
languages exactly like the ones which are imposed.
(DeCarlo, 1969, p.31)
4*1
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XI: Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various
ways; the point, however, is to change it.
(Marx, 1845, p.13)
Production
One wants one's work to be in the world, but of course it's
never the world. The work is in the world; it never contains
the whole thing.
Jasper Johns,
The New York Times Magazine, June 19 1988.
The problem is not to make political films, but to make films
politically.
Jean-Luc Godard
I want to emphasise that theory and practice are by no means
mutually exclusive... The real dilema for filmakers today is not
a choice between theory and practise. The act of making films
necessarily combines both. ( MacBean, 1971.)
Methodology and Production
The reconstruction of a portion of a city, especially a
historically sensitive one, requires a clear understanding of
two important aspects of the work: first, the political stance,
which forms the primary attitudinal framework of values
from which the basic physical and programmatic decisions
and proirities will be based; and second, and equally
important, the methodological stance, which provides the
strategic and mechanical means through which the first will
be carried out. ( Mignucci-Giannoni, 1988, p.3-5)
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It therefore follows that the methodology, either
explicitly or implicity, is political and ideological in
nature, and is also directly part of the productive
forces and relations.
The productive forces... include not just the means of
production ( tools , machines, factories and so on), but labour
power - the skills, knowledge, experience, and other human
faculties used in work. The productive forces represent the
powers society has at its command in material production.
(Shaw, 1985, p.207)
Formrall Working Method
[The] transformation process... must be everpresent in our
working methods. Only by such a dialectical process, will
there be a continuous thread between past and future, and the
maintainence of historical continuity.
Whatever goal architecture may have set for itself, it can
only be meaningful today if it is making a demonstrable
contribution towards the improvement of living conditions
and circumstances. Form must improve conditions, or rather,
must lend a helping hand to people, inciting them to make
their own improvements. ( Hertzberger, 1973)
What we should be focusing on in design is form and
use; our concern is to understand form phenomena
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and physical definitions from many times and places,
to generate the collective provision of form/physical
definitions for our use now.
Active observation: looking/observation as a deep
structure analytical method to recognise formal
phenomena for understanding and projective
production.
Passive observation: viewing and recording as
idealist contemplation, for consumption as a touristic
'postcard'.
To view the universe and to extract explanatory principles
and unifying hypotheses from the rich confusion of
phenomena and processes, one must systematize and use tools
for systematization that are derived from the experience of
the social world and of one's fellow students of the natural
world.
It is precisely at this point that the concept of ideology
becomes of paramount importance in making transparent the
ways in which human understanding becomes refracted by
the social order in which that understanding develops.
(Lewontin, Rose, Kamin, 1984, p.41)
The reason to observe and to recognise form[al]
phenomena and to describe the material world, is as a
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projective or generative reference for production.
Observation/description is an explicit recognition of
"one piece of the world looking at another piece of the
world" [Calvino], not an egocentric or anthropocentric
position in regard to the environment.
The observation of physical definitions already
produced/existing requires the recognition that our
form[al] understanding of spatial/material
organizations may not be a surrogate/record of the
actual dynamics of the historic production over time,
but an understanding of what is built now.
... the state of the art in building technology suggests that
there is not necessarily a conflict between efficient
production and variety of form. In fact, variety might be the
logical outcome of efficient production.
If neither the use nor the technical means dictate uniformity
and rigidity of built forms, design skills may become the
weakest link in the chain. The design of complex, varied
forms that are adaptable over time and nonetheless easy to
control and to build demands new methods and skills.
In turn, such new methods and skills must come from a good
understanding of the structure of complex artifacts. And
much can be learned from the study of enviroments with a
high degree of spatial complexity to find out what their
structure is and what processes could make them come
0 160
I
about...An interest in these environments has nothing to do
with a romantic yearning for past conditions. We are not
looking at them to copy but to learn how today structures of
similar sophistication and resilience may come about in
accordance with the means we have today...What we look for
and what we are interested in here are systematic properties
from which complex environmental organizations can be
built. ( Habraken, 1987, p.3)
Projective Production
The design section of the thesis is an attempt to clarify
a working method. Given that Sunnyside Gardens, in
the borough of Queens, New York City, is one of the
better multiple city block low-rise housing projects of
the first part of this century - this study is seen as an
exercise to make projections for what would be
possible now. These projections are based on
transformational studies of the: site organization and
access, the building system(s), and the inhabitation of
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the collective and private territories.
Clarence Stein was quite clear as to the formal
transformation he saw Sunnyside Gardens manifesting
in relation to the typical housing organizations of the
day. Rather than the subdivided block with a
freestanding building in each lot, he was able to build
some collective landscape by the collective
organization of individual dwellings to make larger
building definitions.
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The projection now is to extend that understanding by
building the collective landscape at a dimension that is
bigger than and not completely defined by the
building size.
Site Organization and Access System
Observations:
The existing site organization reinforces the double
directional field organization street/block definition.
The existing building organization builds the street
edge and by partial 'courtyarding' internalizes and
defends the collective landscape at the center of the
block.
Ground level pedestrian access mirrors street access in
elevation and form as well as the form of the
courtyard organization.
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Projection:
Increase landscape continuity at the full site size, by
transforming city grid block and street organization to
a directional organization that maintains major
thoughfare traffic access but removes the subdivision
from direct lateral access. This allows the building of
larger territories and landscape continuities with
dimensions larger than the existing block size.
Build pedestrian access at both existing ground and
displaced ground elevations. This allows for
separation, as needed, from direct [1:1] association
with the street access and for extension to the existing
elevated transit station (the #7, Times Square <->
Flushing).
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Building Systems
Observations:
The existing reductive system is single floor
containment system that is multiplied and stacked as
required. Extensions to this masonry box are limited
to ground level wood porches, that may or may not be
glazed, and metal 'fire escapes'. These boxes are added
together, with minimal displacements and normal
direction changes, to build the actual building size.
Projection:
Multiple additive building systems: Masonry bearing
walls and lintel/beam with spanning cored concrete
planks to define lateral extent of private territory and
build double floor height zones; light steel framing
with wood T&G planks for internal inhabitation of
double floor heights and exterior extensions; screen
system with attached glazing and panel system for
internal containments (partial) and exterior closure
(full). 0171
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Building System Relations - Wall above Plank
Building System Relations - Wall below Plank
0173
...........
Building System Relations - Lintel above Plank
Building System Relations - Lintel in Wall
Building System Relations - Lintel below Plank
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Inhabitation
Observations:
Existing system is a subdivision of the box, the
subdivisions are at the dimension of a singular use.
Projection:
Initial move is to build a territory larger than a 'unit'
size. This slack increases the options for deployment
of the internal privacies and containments, latter
additions, and a range external territorial landscape
definitions - terraces, gardens at displaced ground etc.
Existing Plans
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Postscript
or: what is to be done?
A whole history remains to be written of spaces - which
would at the same time be the history of power.
Michel Foucault
The primary dialectic of projective and/or generative
work is between the understanding of what is ( how
'things' are and why) and what is possible ( how
'things' could be and why). Historically 'what is
possible' has been limited, in various ways, by the
ruling class to those possibilites that enhance, solidify,
exalt or protect the manifestations of that class power
and its continuation as the ruling system.
If we are to change what is possible, then we must
change the current systems and relations of
production. These will not change easily, or by
evolution, but through struggle. This struggle will take
many forms collectively and individually, both in
The ability to see the big picture
seems to come with age. I remember
when my children first started playing
soccer. At first they could see only the
ball. They chased after it, wherever it
went. Then, as they grew older, they
began to see the playing field as a
whole, and they started to play their
positions. They waited for the ball to
come to them. As they grew older yet,
they began to think about the whole
game, to think about their team and to
develop strategies.
Perhaps it was just that they had
improved their mastery of the technical
skills and could think about putting
their skills together, much as people
-who have learned the mechanics of
driving can focus on driving as a whole,
instead of thinking about braking or
shifting gears. Or, perhaps, they had
just grown older and more mature.
Peter Kugel, January 8, 1989
at eNie gor* Vmes
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theoretical and practical production. In order to
understand change we need to understand what has
been and what is now. We need to analyze the
contradictions within the historic and current
production of built form.
I think that the main purposes of an architect, politically
involved, is to give models, physical models, physical views of
a new kind of organization, translated in terms of form of
course, representing how the world could be. This is what I
mean by political involvement. How do you get to the point of
being in touch with political reality? ( DeCarlo, 1973, p.32)
A Lttle Piece of Joe Hill
The 73d anniversary of the execu-
tion of Joe Hill, one of America's most
incandescent labor leaders, falls on
Saturday, and tomorrow the National
Archives will make a kind of restitu-
tion to his trade union heirs. It is turn-
ing over a sealed vial believed to con-
tain some of Hill's ashes to his organi-
zation, the Industrial Workers of the
World.
In 1913 the 32-year-old Hill organ-
ized a successful strike at the United
Construction Company in Bingham,
Utah. The following year he was con-
victed on charges, apparently
trumped-up, that he had murdered a
Salt Lake City grocer. Hill was exe-
cuted by a firing squad on Nov. 19,
1915.
in accordance with his wish that "I
don't want to be found dead in Utah,"
his body was taken to Chicago and
cremated. His ashes were to be scat-
tered in every state but Utah. Two
years later an envelope containing
ashes and marked "Joe Hill - Mur-
dered by the Capitalist Class" was
sent to a Chicago man. The letter was
seized by the postmaster in Chicago
because the I.W.W. was considered a
subversive organization. Eventually
it wound up in the National Archives,
which tomorrow will present the
ashes to the I.W.W.'s current chair-
man, Frederic Lee.
Don't mourn, organise.
Joe Hill, 1915.
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The initial designing is only a little part of it, the building
has its life to live, just as people do. You might just as well
advise abandoning your children "complete" at birth.
There's a continuing process of growth and change. We're
not making finite art objects to display in fashionable
galleries; we're helping worlds of definition into existence...
(Smith, 1982)
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